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ABSTRACT 
 
Cyber-induced failures affect power system reliability and thus are important to 
be considered in composite system reliability evaluation. This dissertation extends the 
scope of bulk power system reliability modeling and analysis with the consideration of 
cyber elements. 
A novel methodology by introducing the concept of Cyber-Physical Interface 
Matrix (CPIM) is proposed. The failure modes of cyber components and their impact on 
transmission line tripping behaviors are modeled and numerically analyzed as an 
example to illustrate the construction and utility of the CPIM. The methodology is then 
enhanced and implemented on an extended Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) with its 
applicability for large systems illustrated. The results clearly show the impact of cyber-
induced failures on system-wide reliability indices. The CPIM is the critical idea in the 
proposed methodology. It decouples the analysis of the cyber part from the physical part 
and provides the means of performing the overall analysis in a tractable fashion. The 
overall methodology proposed in this dissertation also provides a scalable option for 
reliability evaluation of large cyber-physical power systems. 
The efficiency of the overall methodology can be further improved with the use 
of non-sequential Monte Carlo techniques. However, the failure and repair processes in 
cyber-induced events are inherently sequential involving dependent failures, making it 
difficult to utilize non-sequential sampling methods as simply as when the components 
are independent. In this dissertation, the difficulties of using sampling when there are 
 iii 
 
dependent failures are thoroughly explored. An approach is proposed to overcome the 
difficulties by generating a representative state space and its probabilities from which 
states can be sampled. The proposed approach not only preserves the sequential and 
dependent features of cyber-induced events but also improves the efficiency, which is 
very beneficial for reliability evaluation of large power systems in the presence of cyber-
induced dependent failures. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
CB Circuit Breaker 
CEM Consequent Event Matrix 
CPIM Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
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EFLC Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment 
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IED Intelligent Electronic Device 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
LOLE Loss of Load Expectation 
LOLP Loss of Load Probability 
MRT Mean Repair Time 
MTTF Mean Time To Failure 
MU Merging Unit 
PB Process Bus 
Prot. IED Protection Intelligent Electronic Device 
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PT Potential Transformer 
RBTS Roy Billinton Test System 
RTS Reliability Test System 
SAS Substation Automation System 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
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µi Repair rate of individual component i 
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Scope 
The quantitative reliability indices of bulk power systems are important to utility 
companies, vendors, and regulators for planning, operation, maintenance, and regulatory 
purposes. Studies of bulk power system reliability evaluation have been mostly focusing 
on the current-carrying part. The pertinent theories and methodologies are well 
established and documented [1]-[3]. 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are widely deployed in 
electric power systems to improve system control, protection, monitoring, and data 
processing capabilities. ICT functionalities are generally assumed to be perfectly reliable 
in the process of composite power system reliability evaluation. This assumption may 
have significant effect on the reliability indices calculated and result in too optimistic 
reliability evaluation. For realistic reliability evaluation, it is necessary to consider ICT 
failures and their impact on composite power systems. 
This research aims at extending the scope of bulk power system reliability 
modeling and analysis with the consideration of cyber elements. In particular, a novel 
methodology with the use of Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) is proposed and 
 
*Part of this section is reprinted from Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 129,
Hangtian Lei and Chanan Singh, “Power system reliability evaluation considering cyber-
malfunctions in substations”, pp. 160-169,  2015, with permission from Elsevier.
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demonstrated. The CPIM decouples the analysis of cyber system from the evaluation of 
the physical system and provides the means of performing the overall analysis in a 
tractable fashion. 
In this dissertation, the term “cyber” refers to the devices and activities residing 
in the secondary side of the power system, associated with the functionalities of 
measurement, control, monitoring, and protection. The term “physical” refers to the 
equipment and activities in the primary side of the power system, associated with the 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power and energy. A whole power 
system is also referred to as a “cyber-physical power system”, in which the 
communication networks and power components are interdependent [4]-[6]. The cyber-
physical interdependencies exist extensively in power systems and associate with 
various aspects. This dissertation focuses on the aspect of protection as a facet to study 
such interdependencies since protection system hidden failures are recognized as 
common causes of multiple or cascading outages [7]-[10]. 
1.2 Literature Review 
A protection system consists of circuit breakers, current and voltage 
transformers, communication cables, protective relays, and possibly some auxiliary 
devices [11]-[13]. With the advent of microprocessor-based relays and the rapid progress 
of communication technologies, modern protection panels are equipped with 
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multifunctional Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) that are connected to 
communication networks [14]-[17]. 
Some studies [8], [10], [18]-[22] have been done to consider protection system 
failures in composite power system reliability evaluation. However, due to the variety of 
protection system architectures as well as the diversity of control and communication 
mechanisms, it is hard to explicitly model protection systems with detailed 
configurations. As a result, in most of the previous work, protection system failures were 
either concentrated on circuit breaker trip mechanisms [10], [18] or represented 
abstractly by multistate models [8], [19]-[22], in which the protection system was treated 
as a compact object. Some important technical details inside the protection system, such 
as the placement of cyber elements (e.g., CT/PTs, MUs, and IEDs) and their wire 
connections, were absent in those publications. Due to the absence of such details, the 
interdependencies between cyber elements and physical components were not 
sufficiently covered. In [4] and [5], to study the direct and indirect cyber-physical 
interdependencies, some mathematical terms and operations were defined and proposed 
with applications on small test systems including monitoring, control, and protection 
features. The results in [4] and [5] provide valuable information that indicates the impact 
of cyber element failures on physical system reliability indices. However, excessive self-
defined reliability terms and tedious mathematical operations were introduced in [4] and 
[5]. These terms are hardly available from engineering practice, making it difficult to 
implement the overall methodology in practical applications. Therefore, it is necessary to 
develop a novel reliability evaluation methodology that is scalable for applications in 
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large cyber-physical power systems. Furthermore, non-sequential Monte Carlo methods 
are typically easier to implement and require much less CPU time and memory as 
compared to sequential methods [3], [23], [24]. It would be significantly beneficial for 
the application of developed methodology in large systems if the efficiency is further 
improved with the use of non-sequential techniques, although it is difficult to utilize 
non-sequential sampling methods as simply as when the components are independent 
due to the inherently chronological, causal and dependent features of the failure and 
repair processes in the presence of cyber-induced dependent events. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Procedures 
The major objective of this research is to develop novel methodologies to model 
and evaluate the reliability of composite cyber-physical power systems, which consist of 
current-carrying part and cyber components, in an integrative manner. The scope is to 
focus on substation protection systems as these are very critical to the success of power 
delivery. To illustrate and implement the methodologies, standard reliability test systems 
are extended with substation protection systems considering modern features. 
Furthermore, the possibilities of utilizing non-sequential techniques for efficiency 
improvement are researched. The following are detailed procedures of this research: 
1) Formulate a novel methodology with the use of Cyber-Physical Interface
Matrix (CPIM) which decouples the analysis of cyber part from the physical 
components, design a modern substation protection system with cyber and 
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physical components, analyze the cyber failure modes and their impact on 
physical part, obtain the interface matrix, and illustrate the utility of the 
interface matrix in a composite power system. 
2) Include more technical considerations, such as cyber-link failures, in the
substation protection system model. 
3) Extend a standard reliability test system with modern substation protection
configurations, enhance and implement the proposed reliability evaluation 
methodology with the use of CPIM to obtain numerical reliability indices. 
4) Improve the efficiency of the proposed methodology with the use of non-
sequential techniques. 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a 
novel methodology with the use of Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) and 
performs reliability modeling and analysis at the substation level. Section 3 enhances the 
substation model with consideration of cyber-link failures. Section 4 enhances and 
implements the proposed methodology on an extended standard reliability test system to 
obtain system-wide reliability indices. Section 5 researches the major difficulties of 
applying conventional non-sequential sampling methods to generating appropriate state 
space in the presence of dependent failures and proposes a method to overcome these 
6 
difficulties. The conclusions and outlook are given in Section 6. References are attached 
at the end. 
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2. SUBSTATION LEVEL RELIABILITY MODELING AND ANALYSIS

2.1 Introduction 
The electric power substations are vital nodes among electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution systems. In recent years, utilities, vendors, and research 
institutions have paid close attention to the reliability of substation automation systems 
(SASs) since the failure or malfunctioning of a SAS may have a huge impact on a power 
system. 
The electric power SAS was designed in the past using control and protection 
schemes with electromechanical and hard-wired relay logic [15]. This architecture has 
undergone significant changes with the advent of multi-functional microprocessor-based 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). Traditional panels with dedicated stand-alone 
relays, control switches, meters, and status indicators have been replaced by multi-
functional, smart, and communicative IEDs [16]. 
IEC 61850, the international standard for substation automation, provides 
interoperability between IEDs from different vendors by standardizing the aspects of the 
information exchange between them [25]. The vision of IEC 61850 series is to define an 
 Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from IEEE. 
 2014 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Hangtian Lei, Chanan Singh, and Alex 
Sprintson, “Reliability modeling and analysis of IEC 61850 based substation protection 
systems,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 2194-2202, Sep. 2014. 
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interoperable communication system, which facilitates the implementation of functions 
that are distributed among various IEDs from different vendors [15]. 
Some progress has been made recently in the reliability evaluation of substation 
automation systems. In [26], reliability indices have been investigated and selected to 
identify the critical components in an all-digital protection system. The challenges for 
implementing IEC 61850 based new communication architecture were discussed and 
some possible solutions to several major implementation issues were suggested in [27]. 
In [28], the reliability block diagram approach was used to evaluate the reliability and 
availability of practical Ethernet switch architectures for the SASs. 
However, most of the previous publications focused on either the physical 
components (e.g., transformers, circuit breakers, and transmission lines) or the cyber part 
separately. In [29], the cyber and physical parts of a SAS were integratively analyzed, 
but different bays were analyzed separately at a conceptual level, which may not be 
always true in practice. To overcome this shortcoming, a specific cyber-physical system 
of a typical substation is designed and analyzed using the methodology proposed in this 
section. Furthermore, the concept of Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) is 
introduced and its utility is illustrated. The CPIM depicts the inter-dependencies among 
the failures of different physical components due to various cyber failure modes. It 
decouples the analysis of the cyber part from the physical part and provides the means of 
performing the overall analysis in a computationally tractable way. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the overall 
architecture and main components of the IEC 61850 based SAS are described, a typical 
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IEC 61850 based substation layout, including both physical and cyber parts, is presented. 
In Section 2.3, a general technique for cyber-physical system reliability analysis is 
presented, the detailed analysis for a substation is performed, and the CPIM is obtained. 
The utilization of the interface matrix is then illustrated by incorporating this substation 
into a composite power system. Section 2.4 is the summary of Section 2. 
2.2 Protection Systems Using IEC 61850 
2.2.1 IEC 61850 Hierarchy and Architecture 
A typical architecture of the IEC 61850 based SAS, which consists of three 
levels, is shown in Figure 1. 
Control 
IED
Protection
IED
Protection 
IED
Control 
IED
Protection 
IED
Control 
IED
MU MU
Router
HMI
Control Center
Process Level
Bay Level
Station Level
Process Bus
Station Bus
SCADA
Figure 1. Typical architecture of an IEC 61850 based substation automation system. 
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Process level: This level includes Current Transformers (CTs) / Potential 
Transformers (PTs), Merging Units (MUs), actuators, etc. The voltage and currents 
signals acquired by CTs / PTs are digitized by MUs and sent over the Ethernet network 
to the bay level. 
Bay level: This level includes microprocessor based relays (also known as 
protection IEDs) and bay controllers (control IEDs). Protection IEDs receive information 
coming from the process level, conduct elaborate calculations and send decision signals 
over the Ethernet network. 
Station level: Station level includes the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and 
SCADA system. At this level, the status data of various components in the substation are 
available to operators for monitoring and operation purposes. Operators can also issue 
signals at this level to perform certain kinds of manual control. 
Process bus: The process bus enables the time critical communication between 
the process level and the bay level, which builds a bridge for voltage and currents 
information going from MUs to protection IEDs, and for trip signals going the opposite 
direction. 
Station bus: The station bus enables information exchange between the bay level 
and station level, which makes the status data of the entire substation available to the 
control center for monitoring and operation purposes. 
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2.2.2 IEC 61850 Based Protection System Layout and Configuration 
An IEC 61850 based protection system for a typical 230-69 kV substation is 
designed for the reliability analysis. The integrated system, including physical 
components (e.g., transformers, transmission lines, and circuit breakers) and cyber 
components (e.g., merging units, Ethernet switches, and Prot. IEDs), is shown in Figure 
2. The physical part has been used in [30] to illustrate the protection zones and schemes.
The cyber part is designed according to IEC 61850 standards [31]. 
3 8
4 6
5 7
1
2
9
10
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MU10
Process Bus
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Prot. IED
Prot. IED
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ES
Line 
Protection
Transformer 
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Bus
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Control
230 kV Bus
69 kV Bus
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H
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J
Figure 2. An IEC 61850 based protection system for a 230-69 kV substation. 
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The primary protection zones associated with various fault locations and the 
corresponding circuit breakers needed to trip for fault clearances are listed in Table 1. 
The MTTF [32] values of individual components for reliability calculations are 
obtained from [15], [28], [33]-[35] and tabulated in Table 2. 
Table 1 Substation protection zone division 
Type Fault Location Associated Circuit Breakers 
Line 
A Breaker 1 
B Breaker 2 
I Breaker 9 
J Breaker 10 
Transformer 
E Breakers 4, 6 
F Breakers 5, 7 
Bus 
C Breakers 1, 3, 4 
D Breakers 2, 3, 5 
G Breakers 6, 8, 9 
H Breakers 7, 8, 10 
The MTTF varies for CBs at different voltage levels, or serving different 
functions in the system [35], for the study in this section, a typical value of 100 years is 
chosen. Using MRT of 8 hours from [15] and [28], the failure and repair rates of 
individual components are tabulated in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Reliability data for individual components 
MTTF (year) Failure Rate λ (/year) MRT (h) Repair Rate µ (/year) 
CB 100 0.01 8 1095 
MU 150 0.00667 8 1095 
PB 100 0.01 8 1095 
ES 50 0.02 8 1095 
Prot. IED 150 0.00667 8 1095 
For convenience of analysis, the ES and protection IEDs located at the same 
protection panel are combined into one line protection unit. Normally, for each 
protection unit, redundant protection IEDs are equipped, hence, in the reliability block 
diagram shown in Figure 3, both the protection IEDs are shown in parallel and then in 
series with the ES. The reliability data after combination is shown in Table 3. 
Prot. IED 1
Prot. IED 2
ES
Figure 3. The reliability block diagram of the line protection unit. 
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Table 3 Reliability data for protection units 
Failure Rate λ (/year) Mean Repair Time (h) Repair Rate µ (/year) 
Line Protection Unit 0.02000008 7.99998 1095.002 
Transformer Protection Unit 0.02000008 7.99998 1095.002 
Bus Protection Unit 0.02000008 7.99998 1095.002 
2.3 Reliability Analysis of the Integrated System 
2.3.1 A General Technique for Reliability Analysis of Cyber-Physical Systems 
The complexity and dimensionality of substation automation systems make it 
difficult, if not impossible to conduct the reliability analysis of the whole system, 
physical and cyber, in a single step. Even for the current carrying part alone, it is not 
computationally efficient to model all the components distinctly and simultaneously. 
Therefore, it is necessary to perform the analysis sequentially. 
Our proposed approach is formulated with the following steps: 
1) Develop an interface matrix between the cyber and physical subsystems. This
matrix is called Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM). It defines the 
relationship between the cyber subsystems and physical subsystems in terms 
of failure modes and effects. In developing this matrix, the major interaction 
points between the cyber and physical part need to be identified. 
2) Analyze the cyber part to determine parameters of the interface matrix.
15 
3) Determine probabilities of interface events.
4) Analyze the physical system using the interface matrix.
An example of the Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix M is shown in (2.1). The 
elements of this matrix are the probabilities of interface events. In the following sections, 
the reliability analysis for the system shown in Figure 2 will be presented to illustrate the 
procedures of obtaining these probabilities. 
M = [
𝑝1,1 𝑝1,2
𝑝2,1 𝑝2,2
⋯
𝑝1,𝑛
𝑝2,𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑝𝑚,1 𝑝𝑚,2 ⋯ 𝑝𝑚,𝑛
]    (2.1) 
2.3.2 Individual Component Analysis 
For each component (except the process bus) listed in Table 2, only two states, 
Up and Down, are considered in our study as shown in Figure 4. 
UP DOWN
λ 
μ 
Figure 4. The states diagram for an individual component. 
The probabilities of being in the UP and DOWN states can be calculated using 
equations (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. 
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


upp  (2.2) 



downp (2.3) 
The calculated probabilities for Circuit Breaker (CB), Merging Unit (MU), Line 
Protection Unit, Transformer Protection Unit, and Bus Protection Unit are tabulated in 
Table 4. 
In an ideal environment that utilizes non-blocking switches and has prioritization 
mechanisms, the time of delay is negligibly small. However, in practice, delays might 
occur due to the use of legacy technology, such as bus Ethernet, which is still used in 
some substations, or due to the use of wireless technology. 
Table 4 Probability data for individual components 
Component pup pdown
Circuit Breaker (CB) 0.999990867 0.000009132 
Merging Unit (MU) 0.999993912 0.000006088 
Line Protection Unit 0.999981735 0.000018265 
Transformer Protection Unit 0.999981735 0.000018265 
Bus Protection Unit 0.999981735 0.000018265 
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Compared with fiber-optic communication, wireless communication technologies 
are more economically feasible for small-scale automation systems in rural areas. In 
wireless environments, the delays can be quite large due to the electromagnetic 
interference in high voltage environments. Meanwhile, the radio frequency interference 
from wireless equipment can also affect the functioning of equipment [36], and GOOSE 
packets might be occasionally dropped by the network due to errors. Therefore, there is 
some finite probability that delay may happen in the network. Taking into account this 
probability, delay is modeled as a state of the process bus. Of course, the delay 
probability can be set to zero if needed. 
The state DELAY means that due to the temporarily heavy traffic, the process 
bus does not physically fail but the message transfer is delayed and the delay time is 
over the threshold value that causes the breakers associated with the primary protection 
zone fail to trip in time. The probability of delay given that the PB is not in the DOWN 
state is denoted by pd (=0.003). The state transition diagram of the PB is shown in Figure 
5. 
UP
DOWN
λ 
μ 
DELAY
Figure 5. The states diagram of the process bus. 
Thus, for the Process Bus (PB), the probabilities of being in the UP, DELAY, 
and DOWN states can be calculated using equations (2.4)-(2.6). 
18 
)1( dup pp 




(2.4) 
ddelay pp



 (2.5) 



downp (2.6) 
The reliability analysis of line, transformer, and bus fault clearances for the 
substation shown in Figure 2 are discussed in sections 2.3.3, 2.3.4, and 2.3.5, 
respectively. 
Several assumptions are made: 
1) The cable links between various devices and all the CT/PTs are assumed not
to fail. 
2) If the breaker(s) for the primary protection fail to trip correctly due to the
message delay or due to the failure of the components other than the process 
bus, the trip signal can be transferred to an adjacent protection zone. 
However, if the process bus fails, the entire system is assumed to fail. 
3) If the primary protection fails to trip correctly and the trip signal is
transferred to an adjacent protection zone, the subsequent failure of the trip is 
not considered. 
4) The fault events happening in different areas (e.g., areas A, E, and C) are
analyzed independently. The possibility that faults occur simultaneously at 
different locations is not considered. 
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5) If the message delay at the process bus is beyond a threshold value, the
breaker(s) for the primary protection will fail to trip and the trip signal will be 
transferred to an adjacent protection zone. 
2.3.3 Reliability Analysis of Line Fault Clearance 
As shown in Figure 2, line faults can happen in areas A, B, I, or J. Here, the line 
fault at area A is taken as an example for illustration. The same techniques can be 
applied to faults at B, I, or J. 
When a line fault happens at A, the voltage/current information will be sensed by 
PT/CTs and will be sent to MU1. The information will be digitized at MU1 and then be 
sent to Line Protection Unit via the PB. Based on the information received, relay 
algorithms will be performed at the Line Protection Unit and a trip signal will be sent to 
Circuit Breaker 1 via the PB. There are 4 components associated with this procedure, 
namely, MU1, PB, Line Protection Unit, and CB1. One or more components’ failure will 
result in malfunction. The detailed descriptions of different scenarios are listed as below. 
1) All components operate as intended
If all aforementioned components operate as intended, CB1 will trip in time, and 
only the faulted line will be isolated. The rest of the substation will stay in service. 
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2) PB fails to work
Since PB is the hub of all the cyber links inside the substation, the failure of PB 
will cause all the relays to be unable to receive or send information. All breakers will fail 
to trip and the entire system will be affected by the fault. 
3) One or more components of MU1, Line Protection Unit, CB1 fail to operate
CB1 will not trip at first. When the fault comes to affect area C, bus protection 
will be triggered and CB1, CB3, CB4 will trip. Areas A and C will be out of service. 
4) PB is in UP state, but message delay happens due to temporarily heavy
information traffic 
In this case, the tripping signal will not arrive at CB1 in time and thus CB1 will 
not trip before the breaker failure timer expires, bus protection for area C will then be 
triggered and CB1, CB3, CB4 will trip. 
The probabilities and effects corresponding to each case are shown in Table 5. 
These probabilities are conditional and are calculated given that a fault has already 
happened at location A. To obtain the actual probabilities, they need to be multiplied by 
the probability of this fault occurrence. 
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Table 5 Summary of scenarios of the line fault clearance at A 
Scenario No. Probability Areas Affected 
1 0.996957511 A 
2 0.000009132 Entire Substation 
3 0.000033384 A, C 
4 0.002999973 A, C 
Table 6 Summary of scenarios of the line fault clearance at B 
Areas Affected Probability 
B 0.996957511 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
B, D 0.003033357 
Table 7 Summary of scenarios of the line fault clearance at I 
Areas Affected Probability 
I 0.996957511 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
G, I 0.003033357 
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Table 8 Summary of scenarios of the line fault clearance at J 
Areas Affected Probability 
J 0.996957511 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
H, J 0.003033357 
Similarly, the probabilities and effects of line fault clearances at locations B, I, 
and J are shown in Tables 6-8, respectively. 
2.3.4 Reliability Analysis of Transformer Fault Clearance 
As shown in Figure 2, a transformer winding/ground fault can happen at areas E 
or F. Here, the transformer fault at E is taken as an example for illustration. The same 
techniques can be applied to faults at F. 
When a transformer fault happens at E, the voltage/current information will be 
sensed by corresponding PT/CTs and will be sent to MU4 and MU6. The information 
will be digitized at these merging units and then will be sent to Transformer Protection 
Unit via the PB. Based on the information received, relay algorithms will be performed 
at Transformer Protection Unit and trip signals will be sent to CB4 and CB6 via the PB. 
There are 6 components associated with this procedure, namely, MU4, MU6, PB, 
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Transformer Protection Unit, CB4 and CB6. One or more components’ failure will result 
in malfunction. The detailed descriptions of different scenarios are listed as below. 
1) All components operate as intended
If all aforementioned components operate as intended, CB4 and CB6 will trip as 
intended, only the faulted part E will be isolated and the rest of this substation will stay 
in service. 
2) PB fails to work
Since PB is the hub of all the cyber links inside the substation, the failure of PB 
will cause all the relays to be unable to receive or send information, all breakers will fail 
to trip and the entire system will be affected by this fault. 
3) One or more components of MU4, CB4 fail, while all other components work
as intended 
CB6 will trip as intended, but CB4 will not. When the fault affects area C, the 
bus protection will be triggered and CB1 and CB3 will trip. Areas C and E will be out of 
service. 
4) One or more components of MU6, CB6 fail, while all other components work
as intended 
CB4 will trip as intended, but CB6 will not. When the fault affects area G, the 
bus protection will be triggered and CB8 and CB9 will trip. Areas E, G and I will be out 
of service. 
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5) Both CB4 and CB6 fail to trip due to breakers failure or PB delay, or failure
of Transformer Protection Unit, but PB is not down 
When the fault comes to affect areas C and G, protection devices of these zones 
will be triggered. Areas C, E, G, and I will be isolated from the system. 
The probabilities and effects corresponding to each scenario are shown in Table 
9. These probabilities are calculated given that a fault has already happened at location
E. The actual probabilities need to be multiplied by the probability of this fault 
occurrence. 
Table 9 Summary of scenarios of the transformer fault clearance at E 
Scenario No. Probability Areas Affected 
1 0.996942336 E 
2 0.000009132 Entire Substation 
3 0.000015174 C, E 
4 0.000015174 E, G, I 
5 0.003018182 C, E, G, I 
Similarly, the probabilities and effects of a transformer fault clearance at location 
F are shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10 Summary of scenarios of the transformer fault clearance at F 
Areas Affected Probability 
F 0.996942336 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
D, F 0.000015174 
F, H, J 0.000015174 
D, F, H, J 0.003018182 
2.3.5 Reliability Analysis of Bus Fault Clearance 
A bus fault can happen at locations C, D, G, or H. Here, the bus fault at C is 
taken as an example for illustration. The same techniques can be applied to faults at D, 
G, and H. 
When a bus fault happens at C, the voltage/current information will be sensed by 
the corresponding PT/CTs and will be sent to MU1, MU3, and MU4. The information 
will be digitized at these merging units and then will be sent to Bus Protection Unit via 
the Process Bus. Based on the information received, relay algorithms will be performed 
at the Bus Protection Unit and trip signals will be sent to CB1, CB3, and CB4 via the 
PB. There are 8 components associated with this procedure, namely, MU1, MU3, MU4, 
PB, Bus Protection Unit, CB1, CB3, and CB4. One or more components’ failure will 
result in malfunction. The detailed descriptions of different scenarios are listed as below. 
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1) All components operate as intended
If all components operate as intended, CB1, CB3, and CB4 will trip as intended, 
only the faulted bus will be cut off, and the rest of this substation will stay in service. 
2) PB fails to work
Since PB is the hub of all the cyber links inside the substation, the failure of PB 
will cause all the relays to be unable to receive or send information, all breakers will fail 
to trip and the entire system will be affected by this fault. 
3) One or more components of MU1, CB1 fail, while all other components work
as intended 
CB3 and CB4 will trip as intended, but CB1 will not. When the fault comes to 
affect area A, the breaker located at the substation on the other side of this line will trip. 
Areas A and C will go out of service. 
4) One or more components of MU3, CB3 fail, while all other components work
as intended 
CB1, CB4 will trip as intended, but CB3 will not. When the fault comes to affect 
area D, the bus protection for D will be triggered and CB2 and CB5 will trip. Buses C 
and D will be out of service. 
5) One or more components of MU4, CB4 fail, while all other components work
as intended 
CB1 and CB3 will trip as intended, but CB4 will not. When the fault affects area 
E, the transformer protection will be triggered and CB6 will trip. Bus C and transformer 
E will be out of service. 
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6) One or more components of MU1, CB1 fail and one or more components of
MU3, CB3 fail, while all other components work as intended 
Both CB1 and CB3 will not trip. When the fault comes to affect areas A and D, 
the protection IEDs for these zones will be triggered, CB2, CB5 as well as the breaker 
on the other side of line A will trip. Areas A, C, and D will go out of service. 
7) One or more components of MU1, CB1 fail and one or more components of
MU4, CB4 fail, while all other components work as intended 
Both CB1 and CB4 will not trip. When the fault comes to affect areas A and E, 
the protection IEDs for these zones will be triggered, CB6 and the breaker on the other 
side of line A will trip. Areas A, C, and E will be cut off from the system. 
8) One or more components of MU3, CB3 fail and one or more components of
MU4, CB4 fail, while all other components work as intended 
Both CB3 and CB4 will not trip as intended. When the fault comes to affect areas 
D and E, the protection IEDs for these zones will be triggered, CB2, CB5, and CB6 will 
trip. Areas C, D, and E will be cut off from the system. 
9) All of the CB1, CB3, and CB4 fail to trip due to breakers failure or PB delay
or failure of Bus Protection Unit, but PB is not down 
When the fault comes to affect areas A, D and E, the protection IEDs for these 
zones will be triggered. Areas A, C, D, and E will be isolated from the system. 
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Table 11 Summary of scenarios of the bus fault clearance at C 
Scenario No. Probability Affected Areas 
1 0.996927163 C 
2 0.000009132 Entire Substation 
3 0.000015174 A, C 
4 0.000015174 C, D 
5 0.000015174 C, E 
6 2.31*10
-10
 A, C, D 
7 2.31*10
-10
 A, C, E 
8 2.31*10
-10
 C, D, E 
9 0.003018182 A, C, D, E 
The probabilities and effects corresponding to all the scenarios are shown in 
Table 11. These probabilities are calculated given that a fault has already happened at 
location C. The actual probabilities need to be multiplied by the probability of this fault 
occurrence. 
Similarly, the probabilities and effects of bus fault clearances at locations D, G, 
and H are shown in Tables 12-14, respectively. 
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Table 12 Summary of scenarios of the bus fault clearance at D 
Affected Areas Probability 
D 0.996927163 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
B, D 0.000015174 
C, D 0.000015174 
D, F 0.000015174 
B, C, D 2.31*10
-10
 
B, D, F 2.31*10
-10
 
C, D, F 2.31*10
-10
 
B, C, D, F 0.003018182 
Table 13 Summary of scenarios of the bus fault clearance at G 
Affected Areas Probability 
G 0.996927163 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
G, I 0.000015174 
G, H 0.000015174 
E, G 0.000015174 
G, H, I 2.31*10
-10
 
E, G, I 2.31*10
-10
 
E, G, H 2.31*10
-10
 
E, G, H, I 0.003018182 
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Table 14 Summary of scenarios of the bus fault clearance at H 
Affected Areas Probability 
H 0.996927163 
Entire Substation 0.000009132 
H, J 0.000015174 
G, H 0.000015174 
F, H 0.000015174 
G, H, J 2.31*10
-10
 
F, H, J 2.31*10
-10
 
F, G, H 2.31*10
-10
 
F, G, H, J 0.003018182 
2.3.6 Construction and Utilization of Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix 
The Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) M can be obtained by synthesizing 
the data from Table 5 to Table 14. The elements of this matrix are the probabilities of 
interface events. For the Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) M corresponding to 
the substation illustrated in previous sections, some elements are tabulated in Table 15. 
The CPIM shown in Table 15 can be improved by eliminating the off-diagonal zeros to 
make it more compact. Some examples of better developed CPIMs are presented in 
Section 4.4.1 of this dissertation. 
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Table 15 Elements of matrix M 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 … Column 58 
Row 1 0.996958 0 0 … 0 
Row 2 0 9.1*10
-6
 0 … 0 
Row 3 0 0 0.003033357 … 0 
… … … … … … 
Row 58 0 0 0 … 0.00301818 
Once the CPIM is obtained, its results can be utilized for the reliability analysis 
of a wider area by incorporating this substation into a larger system without considering 
the details of the cyber part. 
To illustrate the utility of the interface matrix, the Monte Carlo simulation 
process for a composite system shown in Figure 6 is explained in the following example. 
The simulation process is for illustration only. Its specific implementation will be 
presented in section 4 of this dissertation. 
Since the CPIM, which depicts the inter-dependencies among the failures of 
different physical components due to various cyber failure modes, is already obtained, 
the simulation process can be performed without considering the details of the cyber 
part. Therefore, only the physical components are shown in Figure 6. All these 
components are numbered in Table 16. 
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The next event sequential simulation [37], in which the time is advanced to the 
occurrence of the next event, is used. For each individual component in this composite 
system, two states, UP and DOWN, are considered. 
The simulation process for the composite system can be formulated in the 
following steps: 
1) Step 1
Set the initial state of all components as UP and set the simulation time t to 0. 
230 kV Bus
69 kV Bus
A
E
F
B
C
D
G
H
I
J
G1
G2
G3
G4
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
Figure 6. A composite system consisting of a substation and other components. 
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Table 16 Components in the composite system 
Number Component Name 
1 Generator G1 
2 Generator G2 
3 Generator G3 
4 Generator G4 
5 Transformer M 
6 Transformer N 
7 Transformer O 
8 Transformer P 
9 Bus Q 
10 Bus R 
11 Line A 
12 Line B 
13 Bus C 
14 Bus D 
15 Transformer E 
16 Transformer F 
17 Bus G 
18 Bus H 
19 Line I 
20 Line J 
21 Bus K 
22 Bus L 
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2) Step 2
For each individual component, draw a random decimal number between 0 and 1 
to compute the time to the next event. 
In this section, the distributions of UP and DOWN times for all components are 
assumed to be exponential. Let Nc be the total number of components, zi (0 < zi < 1, 1 ≤ i 
≤ Nc) be the random number drawn for the i
th
 component. The time to the next transition
of this component is given by: 
𝑇𝑖 = −
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑧𝑖)
𝜌𝑖
(2.7) 
In (2.7), depending on whether the i
th
 component is UP or DOWN, λi or µi is used
in place of ρi. 
3) Step 3
Find the minimum time, change the state of the corresponding component, and 
update the total time. 
The time to the next system transition is given by: 
𝑇 = min{𝑇𝑖} , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁𝑐    (2.8) 
If this T corresponds to Tq, that is, the q
th
 component, then the next transition
takes place by the change of state of this component. The total simulation time t is 
increased by T. 
4) Step 4
Change the q
th
 component’s state accordingly. For each component i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nc,
subtract T from Ti 
𝑇𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇 (2.9) 
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where Ti, res is the residual time to transition of component i. The time Ti is 
updated to: 
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑠 (2.10) 
Since the residual time for component q causing transition becomes 0, therefore, 
the time to its next transition Tq is determined by drawing a new random number and 
using (2.7). 
5) Step 5
If the state of the q
th
 component transits from UP to DOWN, which means a
primary fault happens to this component, then the CPIM is used to determine if there are 
some subsequent failures causing more components out of service due to the cyber part’s 
malfunction. 
Let nq be the number of possible scenarios if a primary fault happens to the q
th
component, and pq, j (1 ≤ j ≤ nq) be the probability of the j
th
 scenario given that a primary
fault already happened at the q
th
 component. These probabilities are directly available
from the CPIM. According to the analysis in sections 2.3.3-2.3.5, the following 
relationship exists: 
∑ 𝑝𝑞,𝑗
𝑛𝑞
𝑗=1 = 1 (2.11) 
For the convenience of further illustration, a zero probability pq,0 is added to the 
left side of (2.11), which yields: 
∑ 𝑝𝑞,𝑗
𝑛𝑞
𝑗=0 = 1 (2.12) 
Draw a random decimal number y (0 < y ≤ 1). Let s (1 ≤ s ≤ nq) be an integer 
which satisfies (2.13). 
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∑ 𝑝𝑞,𝑗
𝑠−1
𝑗=0 < 𝑦 ≤ ∑ 𝑝𝑞,𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=0                     (2.13)
Then the s
th
 scenario is determined to happen. Let S be the set of components that
would go out of service if the s
th
 scenario happens, and S2 be the set such that:
𝑆2 = {𝑘|𝑘 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑞} (2.14) 
For every component k whose state is currently UP and in S2, change its state to 
DOWN, draw a new random number, and calculate the time to its next transition Tk 
using (2.7). Since the failure of component k is caused by the cyber failure rather than a 
primary fault, therefore, an expedited repair rate µk, exp instead of µk is used in (2.7). The 
value of µk, exp is normally available from engineering practice and is called a switching 
rate. 
The following specific case is shown as an example to illustrate the details from 
step 3 to step 5. For the system shown in Figure 6, in the first iteration of Monte Carlo 
simulation, if q = 11 is obtained in step 3, which means a primary fault happens at Line 
A, then T11 is updated in step 4. In step 5, from the CPIM shown in Table 15, n11 = 3, 
p11,1 = 0.996958, p11,2 = 9.1*10
-6
, and p11,3 = 0.003033357 can be obtained.
If the random number y is generated to be 0.9177, as shown in Figure 7, then the 
1
st
 scenario is determined to happen, which means only Line A is going out of service.
Thereby, S = {11} and S2 = {} can be obtained. 
If the random number y is generated to be 0.9987, also as shown in Figure 7, then 
the 3
rd
 scenario is determined to happen, which means both Line A and Bus C would go
out of service. S = {11, 13} and S2 = {13} can be obtained, a new random number z13 is 
generated and µ13, exp is used in (2.7) to calculate the time to its next transition T13. 
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Figure 7. An example of random number mapping. 
6) Step 6
Perform the network power flow analysis to assess system operation states. 
Update reliability indices. 
7) Convergence
Steps 3–6 are iteratively continued until a convergence criterion is satisfied. The 
simulation is said to have converged when the reliability indices attain stable values. For 
any index i, the convergence is measured by its standard error, defined as: 
𝜂 =
𝜎𝑖
√𝑁𝑦
(2.15) 
where σi is the standard deviation of the index i and Ny is the number of years 
simulated. 
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Convergence is said to occur when the standard error in (2.15) drops below a 
preselected value, εi, as shown in (2.16). 
𝜂 < 𝜀𝑖 (2.16) 
When the simulation finishes, reliability indices, such as the Loss of Load 
Expectation, can be finally obtained. 
2.4 Summary 
A novel methodology for modeling and analysis of cyber enabled substation 
protection systems is presented. A typical protection system based on the IEC 61850 
concepts, incorporating both physical and cyber components, is designed. The 
probabilities of various faults and tripping scenarios are calculated. General techniques 
for reliability analysis of cyber-physical systems are presented. The concept of Cyber-
Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) is introduced and its utility is illustrated. The CPIM 
decouples the analysis of the cyber part from the physical part and provides the means of 
performing the overall analysis of a composite system in a more tractable fashion. 
This methodology of finding the CPIM also applies to the reliability analysis of 
substation automation systems with more complex configuration and larger scale. In 
such systems, more effort is needed in detailed analysis of various cyber failure modes 
as well as effects on the physical side. 
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3. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF MODERN SUBSTATIONS CONSIDERING
CYBER-LINK FAILURES

3.1 Introduction 
This section enhances the substation protection system reliability model with the 
consideration of cyber-link failures. 
A substation protection system is a typical cyber-physical system. It consists of 
circuit breakers, current/potential transformers, merging units, and protection panels 
with intelligent electronic devices. These components are connected in an Ethernet-
based environment [38]-[41]. In recent years, numerous research efforts have been 
devoted to study the reliability considerations and implementation issues of modern 
substation automation systems [28], [38]-[44]. 
Due to the complexity of monitoring, control, and communication functions as 
well as the variety of cyber-physical interdependencies, it is challenging to model and 
analyze the complete cyber-physical system with explicit technical details. Therefore, 
most research work focuses either on the cyber part or on the physical part. To cover the 
whole cyber-physical system, it is necessary to divide the overall analysis into 
subsections and proceed sequentially. A tractable methodology of performing the overall 
 Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from IEEE. 
 2015 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Hangtian Lei, Chanan Singh, and 
Alex Sprintson, “Reliability analysis of modern substations considering cyber link 
failures,” in Proc. IEEE Power and Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid 
Technologies 2015 Asian Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, Nov. 2015. 
40 
analysis by decoupling the cyber part from the physical part has been proposed in 
Section 2 [42] of this dissertation by introducing the concept, Cyber-Physical Interface 
Matrix (CPIM). 
The example provided in Section 2 is for the purpose of illustration and some 
technical details have been simplified in modeling the cyber network. For example, the 
traffic delay is modeled as a state with a predefined probability value and the links in the 
communication network are assumed to never fail. 
This section applies the methodology proposed in Section 2 to a 4-bus power 
system with the consideration of more technical details in the cyber part. Unlike some 
previous publications [38], [39] performing simulations to study the issue of packet 
delay, this section mathematically models delay as the unavailability of communication 
links. The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the test 
system configuration and parameters. The issue of link unavailability due to packet delay 
is also discussed and modeled in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 outlines the overall procedures. 
In Section 3.4, the results and discussions are provided. Section 3.5 is the summary of 
this section. 
3.2 System Configuration and Parameters 
To illustrate the interactions between cyber and physical components, the 
reliability of a 4-bus power system with Ethernet-based protection configurations is 
analyzed in this section as an example. The physical part of the system is taken from 
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[45]. The cyber part is designed according to the typical configurations of modern 
substation protection systems. 
3.2.1 Configuration and Parameters of the Physical Part 
The physical part of the system shown in Figure 8 is as described in [45]. The 
load and generation capacities are tabulated in Table 17, of which the loads are directly 
obtained from [45]. The generation capacities at substations (buses) 1 and 4 are assumed 
to be 250 MW and 300 MW, respectively. This assumption is based on the consideration 
of a 10% capacity reserve for the whole system. Compared to line faults, bus faults are 
relatively rare and thus are not considered in the reliability analysis of this section. 
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G1
G4
Bus 1 Bus 2
Bus 3 Bus 4
50 MW 170 MW
200 MW 80 MW
250 MW
300 MW
Line 1
Line 2 Line 3
Line 4
Line 5 Line 6
Line 7 Line 8
Load Point 1 Load Point 2
Load Point 3 Load Point 4
 
Figure 8. The physical part of the test system. 
 
 
Table 17 Generation and load capacities 
 
Bus No. Generation Capacity (MW) Load Capacity (MW) 
1 250 50 
2 0 170 
3 0 200 
4 300 80 
Total 550 500 
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3.2.2 Configuration and Parameters of the Cyber Part 
The Ethernet-based protection system is designed for each substation (bus), as 
shown in Figure 9. For the protection system at each substation, three Ethernet switches 
are used and they are connected in a ring topology. Take substation 1 as an example, the 
cyber component names and their meanings are tabulated in Table 18. 
G1
G4
MU
1-1
MU
1-3
MU
1-2
ES 1-1 ES 1-2
ES 1-3
S1-L5
MU
2-1
MU
2-2
MU
2-3
ES 2-1 ES 2-2
ES 2-3
S2-L6
Line 5
Line 2
Line 1
Line 6
Line 3
Line 4
Line 7
Line 8
S1-L1 S1-L2 S2-L3 S2-L1
Bus 1 Bus 2
Bus 3 Bus 4
MU
3-2
MU
3-1
MU
3-3
ES 3-1 ES 3-2
ES 3-3
S3-L4 S3-L7 S3-L2
MU
4-2
MU
4-1
MU
4-3
ES 4-1 ES 4-2
ES 4-3
S4-L3 S4-L8 S4-L4
Figure 9. The integrated test system. 
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Table 18 Cyber component names and meanings 
Component Name Meaning 
MU 1-1 Merging Unit 1 at Substation 1 
MU 1-2 Merging Unit 2 at Substation 1 
MU 1-3 Merging Unit 3 at Substation 1 
ES 1-1 Ethernet Switch 1 at Substation 1 
ES 1-2 Ethernet Switch 2 at Substation 1 
ES 1-3 Ethernet Switch 3 at Substation 1 
S1-L5 Line 5 Protection Panel at Substation 1 
S1-L1 Line 1 Protection Panel at Substation 1 
S1-L2 Line 2 Protection Panel at Substation 1 
The circuit breaker reliability data for this section are based on the data from 
[28], [35]. The reliability data for merging units, Ethernet switches, and line protection 
panels are not widely available. Based on [28], [33], [34], the failure rates and Mean 
Repair Times are tabulated in Table 19. Components of the same category are assumed 
identical and therefore have the same reliability data. In this section, the current and 
potential transformers are assumed to never fail. 
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Table 19 Reliability data for components 
Component Failure Rate (/year) Mean Repair Time (h) 
Circuit Breaker 0.01 8 
Merging Unit 0.02 8 
Ethernet Switch 0.01 8 
Line Protection Panel 0.02 8 
3.2.3 Link Failure in the Cyber Network 
Generally, there are two types of cyber link failures: (a) A link is unavailable due 
to packet delay resulting from traffic congestion or queue failure; (b) A link is physically 
damaged. Failure type (b) is relatively rare and thus only failure type (a) is considered in 
this section. 
To illustrate how to model the cyber link unavailability, the cyber part of 
substation 1 is separated from the physical part and the cyber links are numbered from 1 
to 21, as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. The cyber part of substation 1. 
In Figure 10, the traffic on links 10-21 is relatively light compared with other 
links. Therefore, links 10-21 are considered congestion free. 
Each link is bidirectional and each direction has a queue. Consider a link i 
connecting components a and b. The time it takes for a packet to travel from component 
a to b is a random variable denoted by ti.1. For the reverse direction (from b to a), the 
random time is denoted by ti.2. Depending on the arrival and departure stochastic 
processes associated with each queue on link i, the values of ti.1 and ti.2 follow some 
probability distribution functions. 
Consider the communication from component a to x. We say this communication 
is unavailable if the time it takes on every possible path from a to x is greater than a 
predefined threshold delay value. 
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For example, consider the communication from MU 1-1 to S1-L1. There are two 
possible paths, 1-8-4 and 1-7-9-4. Assuming that all associated links are in forward 
directions, the probability of communication path failure is: 
𝑝𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 = Pr[(𝑡1.1 + 𝑡8.1 + 𝑡4.1 > 𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑑) 𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡(𝑡1.1 + 𝑡7.1 + 𝑡9.1 + 𝑡4.1 > 𝑇𝑡𝑠𝑑)]   (3.1)
where Ttsd is a predefined threshold delay value for the two paths. 
Therefore, the effects of link failures can be modeled as the probabilities of 
“communication path failure” between any two components. These probabilities can be 
obtained by modeling and analyzing the queueing process at both the link and the path 
levels. The detailed procedures are based on queueing theory and are beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. These probabilities are assumed directly at the path level. Only the 
paths between merging units and protection panels are of our interest and the 
corresponding probabilities are tabulated in Table 20. The probabilities given are an 
example. The methodology of modeling link failures proposed in this section is general 
and also applicable for other probability values. For each cyber link, we assume its 
forward queue and reverse queue are independent. Therefore, for each path, it is 
assumed that the forward failure and reverse failure are independent. 
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Table 20 Communication path failure probabilities 
From To Forward Path Failure Probability Reverse Path Failure Probability 
MU 1-1 S1-L5 0.002 0.002 
MU 1-1 S1-L1 0.001 0.001 
MU 1-1 S1-L2 0.001 0.001 
MU 1-2 S1-L5 0.001 0.001 
MU 1-2 S1-L1 0.001 0.001 
MU 1-2 S1-L2 0.002 0.002 
MU 1-3 S1-L5 0.001 0.001 
MU 1-3 S1-L1 0.002 0.002 
MU 1-3 S1-L2 0.001 0.001 
3.3 Reliability Analysis 
The overall procedures can be divided into two stages: (a) Reliability analysis of 
the cyber part; (b) Reliability evaluation for the entire power system. 
In stage (a), the failure modes of individual cyber components and their 
combinations are examined and analyzed. For each cyber component, only two states, 
Up and Down, are considered. Besides, there are some assumptions: 
1) If the primary protection fails to isolate the fault and the trip signal is
transferred to adjacent protection zones, this fault can always be isolated by 
adjacent protection zones. 
2) The current and potential transformers are assumed to always work.
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3) Only the first-order primary faults are considered. The situations in which
multiple primary faults occur concurrently on different lines are not 
considered. 
4) All the cyber components in this system are considered statistically
independent and thus common-mode failures are not considered. 
5) A successful operation requires that neither the forward path nor the reverse
path is in failure mode. 
The objective of stage (a) is to obtain the Consequent Event Matrix (CEM) and 
the Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM), in which the consequent events and their 
probabilities are summarized. To obtain these probabilities, the consequent events after a 
primary fault occurs at each line are analyzed. Two states, Up and Down, are considered 
for each component. The probability of a consequent event can be obtained by 
multiplying the Up/Down probabilities of the components associated with this event. To 
illustrate the analysis in stage (a), the procedures of obtaining the probabilities in the first 
row (corresponding to the primary fault occurring at line 1) are provided as follows. The 
procedures are similar for primary faults occurring at other lines. 
When a primary fault occurs at line 1, there are four possible scenarios. 
1) Both of the two terminal circuit breakers operate as intended.
For the convenience of further illustration, the circuit breaker on line 1 at bus 1 
side is referred to as “breaker 1-1” and the circuit breaker on line 1 at bus 2 side is 
referred to as “breaker 1-2”. The operation of breaker 1-1 associates with these 
components: breaker 1-1, MU 1-3, ES 1-3, Line Protection Panel S1-L1, forward 
50 
communication path, and reverse communication path. The Up and Down probabilities 
of each component can be calculated from the data in Tables 19 and 20. Therefore, the 
successful operation probability of breaker 1-1, denoted by p1, can be obtained by 
multiplying the Up probabilities of all associated components. Similarly, the successful 
operation probability of breaker 1-2, denoted by p2, can be obtained by multiplying the 
Up probabilities of the associated components in bus 2. The product of p1 and p2 would 
be the probability of this consequent event, in which only line 1 will be isolated after the 
primary fault. 
2) Breaker 1-2 operates as intended while breaker 1-1 does not.
In this case, at least one associated component in bus 1 is in Down state while all 
associated components in bus 2 are in Up state. As a result, lines 1, 2, and 5 will be 
isolated. The probability of this consequent event is therefore (1 – p1)p2. 
3) Breaker 1-1 operates as intended while breaker 1-2 does not.
In this case, at least one associated component in bus 2 is in Down state while all 
associated components in bus 1 are in Up state. As a result, lines 1, 3, and 6 will be 
isolated. The probability of this consequent event is therefore (1 – p2)p1. 
4) Neither breaker 1-1 nor breaker 1-2 operates as intended.
This consequent event is a result from the failure of at least one associated 
component in bus 1 and at least one associated component in bus 2. The probability of 
this event is therefore (1 – p1)(1 – p2). In this event, lines 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 will be 
isolated. 
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Following similar procedures as performed above, the results of a primary fault 
occurring at each line are obtained and tabulated in Tables 21 and 22. 
After the probabilities of all cyber induced consequent events are obtained in 
stage (a), the analysis proceeds to stage (b), in which the reliability evaluation is 
performed at the power system level. Using the two matrices obtained in stage (a), the 
effects of protection malfunctions can be taken into account without considering the 
details of the cyber part. The procedures of a Monte Carlo simulation for the reliability 
evaluation in stage (b) have been formulated in Section 2 [42] of this dissertation. The 
detailed implementation will be presented in Section 4 of this dissertation. The reliability 
indices at load points can be obtained after the two stages of analysis. 
3.4 Results and Discussions 
3.4.1 Results 
After the analysis of the cyber part, the Consequent Event Matrix (CEM) and the 
Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) are obtained, as shown in Tables 21 and 22, 
respectively. 
In the CEM, each entry is an 8-digit binary code in which each digit corresponds 
to the status of a line. A “1” means that the corresponding line is going out of service 
after a primary fault whereas a “0” means that the corresponding line is not affected. For 
example, an entry “11001000” in the first row means that lines 1, 2, and 5 are going out 
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of service after a primary fault occurs on line 1. It should be noted that the CEM is a 
result of the failure of cyber part. If the cyber part worked as it is meant to, then a 
primary fault on a line will not result in the isolation of other lines. 
In the CPIM, each entry gives the probability of a consequent event given that a 
primary fault occurs on a particular line. Each row corresponds to the location of a 
primary fault. For example, the probability corresponding to the event “11001000” in the 
first row is the probability of lines 1, 2, and 5 going out of service given that a primary 
fault already occurred on line 1. If the cyber part had perfect reliability, then column 1 
would have probabilities 1 and other columns zero. 
Table 21 The consequent event matrix 
Primary Fault Location Consequent Events 
Line 1 10000000 11001000 10100100 11101100 
Line 2 01000000 11001000 01010010 11011010 
Line 3 00100000 10100100 00110001 10110101 
Line 4 00010000 01010010 00110001 01110011 
Line 5 00001000 11001000 00000000 00000000 
Line 6 00000100 10100100 00000000 00000000 
Line 7 00000010 01010010 00000000 00000000 
Line 8 00000001 00110001 00000000 00000000 
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Table 22 The cyber-physical interface matrix 
Primary Fault Location Probabilities of Consequent Events 
Line 1 0.9919152 0.0040342 0.0040342 0.0000164 
Line 2 0.9919152 0.0040342 0.0040342 0.0000164 
Line 3 0.9919152 0.0040342 0.0040342 0.0000164 
Line 4 0.9919152 0.0040342 0.0040342 0.0000164 
Line 5 0.9959494 0.0040506 0 0 
Line 6 0.9959494 0.0040506 0 0 
Line 7 0.9959494 0.0040506 0 0 
Line 8 0.9959494 0.0040506 0 0 
3.4.2 The Effect of Path Failure Probability 
In section 3.2.3, a probability with value 0.002 is assumed as both the forward 
and the reverse path failure probabilities for the communication path between a merging 
unit and the corresponding line protection panel. For the convenience of illustration, this 
probability is called the probability of main path failure. In practice, its value may vary 
due to data traffic or some other factors. Its value also has an important impact on the 
probability of successful operations (such as the event “10000000”). 
Table 23 shows the relationship between the probability of main path failure and 
the probability of only line 1 being isolated given that a primary fault already occurred 
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on line 1. Consider the symmetry of the system configuration, similar relationships exist 
for the primary faults on other lines. 
Table 23 Effect of main path failure on successful operation for line 1 
Main Path Failure Probability Probability of Successful Operation Compared to 0.9919152 
0.002 0.9919152 0.000% 
0.004 0.9839879 - 0.799% 
0.006 0.9761082 - 1.594% 
0.008 0.9682758 - 2.383% 
0.01 0.9604907 - 3.168% 
0.02 0.9222671 - 7.022% 
0.04 0.8492535 - 14.382% 
3.4.3 Discussions 
From the results shown in Tables 21 and 22, it can be seen that the probabilities 
of undesired trips due to cyber failures are relatively small. However, such events have 
significant impact on system reliability. For example, when a primary fault occurs on 
line 1, the probability of lines 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 being isolated concurrently is only 
0.0000164. But if this consequent event happens, buses 1 and 2 will be isolated from the 
system with significant amount of load affected. Furthermore, such events may possibly 
cause severe stability issues. Therefore, the impact of cyber failures on power system 
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reliability is significant. More detailed evaluation of such impact will be performed in 
Section 4 of this dissertation. 
The results shown in Table 23 indicate a close relationship between the link 
failure and successful operation probability. The probability of successful operation 
decreases drastically with increasing communication path failure probability. In some 
severe cases, for instance, when the main path failure probability increases to 0.02 due to 
heavy data traffic or queue failure, the probability of successful operation drops below 
0.95, which is not acceptable. 
3.5 Summary 
In this section, a power system configuration is extended to include the Ethernet-
based protection architectures with the consideration of cyber link failures. A systematic 
methodology is implemented to evaluate the reliability of this extended system. The 
analysis performed in this section is mostly at the substation level. In the following 
section, reliability evaluation at the composite system level will be performed. 
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4. COMPOSITE POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY EVALUATION
CONSIDERING CYBER-MALFUNCTIONS IN SUBSTATIONS

4.1 Introduction 
In composite power system reliability evaluation, due to the variety of protection 
system architectures as well as the diversity of control and communication mechanisms, 
it is hard to explicitly model protection systems with detailed configurations. As a result, 
in most of the previous work, protection system failures were either concentrated on 
circuit breaker trip mechanisms [10] or represented abstractly by multistate models [8], 
[19]-[21], in which the protection system was treated as a compact object. Some 
important technical details inside the protection system, such as the placement of cyber 
elements (e.g., CT/PTs, MUs, and IEDs) and their wire connections, were absent in 
those publications. Due to the absence of such details, the interdependencies between 
cyber elements and physical components were not sufficiently covered. In [4] and [5], to 
study the direct and indirect cyber-physical interdependencies, some mathematical terms 
and operations were defined and proposed with applications on small test systems 
including monitoring, control, and protection features. The results in [4] and [5] provide 
valuable information that indicates the impact of cyber element failures on physical 
  Part of this section is reprinted from Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 129, 
Hangtian Lei and Chanan Singh, “Power system reliability evaluation considering cyber-
malfunctions in substations”, pp. 160-169,     2015, with permission from Elsevier.  
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system reliability indices. However, excessive self-defined reliability terms and tedious 
mathematical operations were introduced in [4] and [5]. These terms are hardly available 
from engineering practice, making it difficult to implement the overall methodology in 
practical applications. 
A more systematic and scalable methodology was proposed in Section 2 [42] of 
this dissertation. This methodology performs the overall analysis in a tractable fashion 
with the use of Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM). In Section 2, a typical 
substation protection system with detailed architecture was designed and analyzed as an 
example to illustrate the procedures of obtaining a CPIM. The steps on how to use a 
CPIM in composite power system reliability evaluation were also formulated. The 
substation model was further enhanced in Section 3 with the consideration of cyber-link 
failures. 
The composite power system displayed in Section 2 is simple and is used for 
illustration only. The overall methodology with the use of CPIM needs to be further 
demonstrated with its implementation on a standard test system so that the impact of 
protection failures on system-wide reliability indices can be numerically validated. Also, 
the scalability of the overall methodology needs further illustration as this is very 
important to its application for large power systems. Moreover, the unavailability of a 
standard reliability test system containing practical protection features is an obstacle for 
validation of the impact of protection failures on system-wide reliability indices. 
Extending a standard reliability test system with detailed descriptions on the cyber part 
would be beneficial for future studies in this area. With these objectives, this section 
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continues and enhances the work that has been performed in Section 2. The remainder of 
this section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the overall methodology. 
Section 4.3 presents the test system configuration and parameters. In Section 4.4, the 
overall analysis, including the reliability analysis at the substation level and the 
reliability evaluation at the composite system level, is performed. Also, the results are 
presented and summarized. The scalability of the overall methodology is illustrated in 
Section 4.5. Some major considerations in software implementation for large power 
systems are discussed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 is the summary of this section. 
4.2 Methodology Outline and Objectives 
The cyber-physical interdependencies exist in many aspects of power systems, 
including but not limited to supervisory control, protection, monitoring, and metering. 
This section focuses on the aspect of protection since protection hidden failures are 
recognized as common causes of expanded outages and have significant impact on 
power system reliability [7]-[10], [19]-[21]. 
In this section, reliability evaluation is performed in a composite power system 
consisting of current-carrying components and protection systems. The Roy Billinton 
Test System (RBTS) [46] is used as the test system with extensions at load buses to 
include detailed configuration in terms of protection system elements. 
The size of this system is small to permit reasonable time for extension of cyber 
part and development of interface matrices but the configuration of this system is 
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sufficiently detailed to reflect the actual features of a practical system [47]. The 
methodology performed in this section also applies for large systems. For large systems, 
in spite of more efforts needed in detailed analysis of cyber failure modes as well as 
effects on the physical side, the main procedures are identical to those performed in this 
section. In short, the selected system is adequate to illustrate the methodology and 
extension to larger systems is more mechanical effort rather than illustrating the validity 
of the technique. 
The overall analysis mainly consists of two stages: 1) Reliability analysis of 
protection systems at the substation level; 2) Reliability evaluation from the system-wide 
perspective. 
 
4.2.1 Reliability Analysis at the Substation Level 
 
The failure modes of protection systems in terms of basic cyber elements and 
their relationships to transmission line tripping scenarios are analyzed in this stage. The 
CPIMs, which depict the interdependencies among the failures of physical components 
due to various cyber failure modes, are obtained at the end of this stage. 
 
4.2.2 Reliability Evaluation from the System-wide Perspective 
 
In this stage, a sequential Monte Carlo simulation is performed on the composite 
system to obtain system-wide reliability indices. The results of CPIMs obtained in the 
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previous stage are directly utilized in this stage without the necessity of considering 
protection system configuration details. At the end of this stage, system-wide reliability 
indices, such as Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), 
Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS), and Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment 
(EFLC), for each bus and for the overall system, can be obtained. 
4.2.3 System-wide Reliability Indices 
The following system-wide reliability indices [8], [20], [47] are defined and used 
in this section. 
4.2.3.1 Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) 
𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑃 = ∑
𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1 (4.1) 
where, 
Ns Total number of iterations simulated; 
Hi Equals 1 if load curtailment occurs in the i
th
 iteration; otherwise it equals 0;
ti Simulated time in the i
th
 iteration, with the unit of year;
ttotal Total simulated time, with the unit of year. 
Since a sequential Monte Carlo simulation is performed, “iteration” here means a time 
period between two instants of system state change. 
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4.2.3.2 Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) 
𝐿𝑂𝐿𝐸 = 𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑃 ∙ 8760 (4.2) 
with the unit of hours/year. 
4.2.3.3 Expected Energy not Supplied (EENS) 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 = ∑
8760𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1 (4.3) 
with the unit of MWh/year, 
where, 
Ns Total number of iterations simulated; 
Ri Load curtailment during the i
th
 iteration, with the unit of MW;
ti Simulated time in the i
th
 iteration, with the unit of year;
ttotal Total simulated time, with the unit of year. 
4.2.3.4 Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment (EFLC) 
𝐸𝐹𝐿𝐶 = ∑
𝑍𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑁𝑠
𝑖=2 (4.4) 
with the unit of (/year), 
where, 
Ns Total number of iterations simulated; 
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Zi Equals 1 if load curtailment does not happen in the (i-1)
th
 iteration AND
load curtailment happens at the i
th
 iteration; otherwise it equals 0;
ttotal Total simulated time, with the unit of year. 
4.3 Test System Configuration 
The Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) [46] is used as the test system in this 
section. The single line diagram of the RBTS is shown in Figure 11. The bus, generation, 
load, and transmission line data are also provided in this section. 100 MVA and 230 kV 
are used as the base values of power and voltage throughout this section. 
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Figure 11. Single line diagram of the RBTS. 
 
 
4.3.1 Bus, Generation, and Load Data 
 
The data for all the buses and generating units are obtained from [46] and are 
tabulated in Tables 24 and 25, respectively. A DC optimal power flow model is used in 
case of load curtailment. Therefore, only the real power data are considered. 
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Table 24 Bus data 
 
Bus No. Name in Figure 11 Peak Load (p.u.) Generation Capacity (p.u.) 
1 Generating Station 1 0.00 1.10 
2 Generating Station 2 0.20 1.30 
3 Load Bus 3 0.85 0 
4 Load Bus 4 0.40 0 
5 Load Bus 5 0.20 0 
6 Load Bus 6 0.20 0 
 
 
Table 25 Generating unit data 
 
Unit No. Bus Rating (MW) Failure Rate (per year) MRT (hours) 
1 1 40 6.0 45 
2 1 40 6.0 45 
3 1 10 4.0 45 
4 1 20 5.0 45 
5 2 5 2.0 45 
6 2 5 2.0 45 
7 2 40 3.0 60 
8 2 20 2.4 55 
9 2 20 2.4 55 
10 2 20 2.4 55 
11 2 20 2.4 55 
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4.3.1.1 Generation Variation 
 
The generators are represented by reliability models with two states, up and 
down. The corresponding failure rate and Mean Repair Time (MRT) are obtained from 
[46] and are tabulated in Table 25. 
 
4.3.1.2 Load Variation 
 
The annual peak load data for each bus are obtained from [46] and are shown in 
Table 24. The hourly load profile is created based on the information in Tables 1, 2, and 
3 of the IEEE Reliability Test System [48]. 
 
4.3.2 Transmission Line Data 
 
The transmission line physical parameters and outage data are obtained from [46] 
and are tabulated in Tables 26 and 27, respectively. 
A DC optimal power flow model with simplified line parameters is used in case 
of load curtailment. Therefore, the line resistance (R) as well as the charging susceptance 
(B) are not considered in the transmission line model and only the line reactance (X) is 
provided in Table 26. Furthermore, in the DC optimal power flow model, since the 
voltage magnitude at each bus is assumed to be 1.0 p.u., the current rating for each line 
shown in Table 26 is numerically equal to the power rating. 
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For the transmission line outage data, compared with [46], the transient outage 
(normally with duration of less than one minute) is not considered in this section. 
Instead, a new term switching time is defined. The switching time for each transmission 
line, which is tabulated in Table 27, defines the time needed to switch a line back to 
service when this line is tripped due to a protection failure rather than resulting from a 
primary fault occurs at this line. The reciprocal of a switching time is called a switching 
rate and has been illustrated in Section 2 of this dissertation. 
 
Table 26 Transmission line physical parameters 
 
Line No. 
Buses 
Reactance X (p.u.) Current Rating (p.u.) 
From To 
1 1 3 0.180 0.85 
2 2 4 0.600 0.71 
3 1 2 0.480 0.71 
4 3 4 0.120 0.71 
5 3 5 0.120 0.71 
6 1 3 0.180 0.85 
7 2 4 0.600 0.71 
8 4 5 0.120 0.71 
9 5 6 0.120 0.71 
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Table 27 Transmission line outage data 
 
Line 
No. 
Buses 
Permanent Outage Rate (per 
year) 
Outage Duration 
(hours) 
Switching Time 
(hours) 
From To 
1 1 3 1.5 10.0 4.0 
2 2 4 5.0 10.0 4.0 
3 1 2 4.0 10.0 4.0 
4 3 4 1.0 10.0 4.0 
5 3 5 1.0 10.0 4.0 
6 1 3 1.5 10.0 4.0 
7 2 4 5.0 10.0 4.0 
8 4 5 1.0 10.0 4.0 
9 5 6 1.0 10.0 4.0 
 
 
4.3.3 Protection System Architecture and Reliability Data 
 
For bus 6, since it is connected with only one transmission line (line 9), even if 
its own protection system fails, line 9 will always be de-energized by opening the 
breakers at bus 5 without isolating any other lines. Therefore, the protection system 
configuration at bus 6 is not considered and only buses 3, 4, and 5 in the RBTS are 
extended to include detailed protection system configurations, as shown in Figures 12, 
13, and 14, respectively. 
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Figure 12. The protection system for bus 3. 
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Figure 13. The protection system for bus 4. 
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Figure 14. The protection system for bus 5. 
 
 
The reliability data for Circuit Breakers (CBs), Merging Units (MUs), Process 
Buses (PBs), and Line Protection Panels are tabulated in Table 28. We assume that a 
same type of elements at different substations are identical and thereby have the same 
reliability data. 
According to engineering practice, the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) varies for 
Circuit Breakers at different voltage levels, or serving different functions in the system 
[35]. For the study in this section, a typical value of 100 years is chosen for the MTTF 
and a value of 8 hours is used for the Mean Repair Time (MRT). 
The reliability data for MUs, PBs, and Line Protection Panels are reasonably 
chosen based on the information from [15], [28], [33], and [34]. 
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Table 28 Reliability data for protection system elements 
 
Element Name MTTF (year) Failure Rate λ (/year) MRT (h) Repair Rate µ (/year) 
CB 100 0.01 8 1095 
MU 50 0.02 8 1095 
PB 100 0.01 8 1095 
Line Protection Panel 50 0.02 8 1095 
 
 
In this study, only two states, UP and DOWN, are considered for each protection 
system element (except the process bus) listed in Table 28. The state transition diagram 
is shown in Figure 15. The failure and repair rates are denoted by λ and µ, respectively. 
 
UP DOWN
λ 
μ 
 
Figure 15. State transition diagram of individual element. 
 
 
The exponential distribution is assumed for state residence times of each 
element, the probabilities of UP and DOWN can be calculated using equations (4.5) and 
(4.6), respectively. 
𝑝𝑈𝑃 =
µ
𝜆+µ
                                                                                                         (4.5) 
𝑝𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 =
𝜆
𝜆+µ
                                                                                                    (4.6) 
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For the Process Bus (PB), an additional state representing DELAY is included as 
shown in Figure 16. The probability of delay given that the PB is not in the DOWN state 
is denoted by pd (=0.003). The illustration of this reliability model as well as the 
discussion regarding delay issues in substation communication networks have been 
presented in Section 2 of this dissertation. 
 
UP
DOWN
λ 
μ 
DELAY
 
Figure 16. State transition diagram of the process bus. 
 
 
Therefore, for the Process Bus, the UP, DELAY and DOWN probabilities can be 
calculated using equations (4.7)-(4.9). 
𝑝𝑈𝑃.𝑃𝐵 =
µ
𝜆+µ
(1 − 𝑝𝑑)                                                                                      (4.7) 
𝑝𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌.𝑃𝐵 =
µ
𝜆+µ
𝑝𝑑                                                                                           (4.8) 
𝑝𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁.𝑃𝐵 =
𝜆
𝜆+µ
                                                                                                (4.9) 
In reality, the process bus is a network consisting of basic elements that are 
connected with each other in various topologies and thus more sophisticated technical 
details are involved [34], [38]-[41]. The consideration of these technical details in 
composite system reliability evaluation is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The assumptions regarding other protection elements (e.g., CTs, PTs, and cable 
links) and protection issues such as backup tripping follow those stated in Section 2 of 
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this dissertation. The CTs, PTs, and cable links are assumed not to fail. In addition, 
based on the features of this particular test system, several more assumptions are made: 
1) The failure of an MU that is connected to a PT will result in the failure of 
acquired voltage information and thus will disable the primary protection of 
this line. As a result, multiple breakers associated with the primary protection 
will fail to trip and backup protections will be triggered. For example, in the 
bus 3 protection system (shown in Figure 12), if a primary fault happens at 
Line 6 but MU 3-6 fails, then the Line 6 Protection Panel will fail to issue trip 
signals to both breakers 3-1 and 3-4. As a result, backup protection zones will 
be triggered and breakers 3-2 and 3-5 will trip to isolate Line 6. 
2) Since this study focuses on transmission system reliability evaluation and the 
details of a load branch can be extended in the distribution system. Therefore, 
primary faults that occur at load branches are not considered. However, the 
isolation of a load branch resulting from undesired trips due to primary faults 
that occur at adjacent transmission lines will be considered. 
 
4.4 Reliability Analysis 
 
The overall analysis mainly consists of two stages: the reliability analysis of 
protection systems at the substation level and the reliability evaluation from the system-
wide perspective. The CPIM, which bridges the two stages, is a critical idea of this 
 73 
 
methodology. It decouples the analysis at the substation level from the evaluation of the 
composite system and makes the overall analysis more tractable. 
 
4.4.1 Substation Level Reliability Analysis 
 
The substation level reliability analysis follows the procedures described in 
Section 2 of this dissertation with the objective of obtaining CPIMs. 
This section improves the CPIM that was described in Section 2 by eliminating 
the off-diagonal zeros to make it more compact. In this section, each row in a CPIM 
represents a physical component (transmission line). Each column provides the 
probability of a consequent event given that a primary fault occurred on this physical 
component. Therefore, the probabilities in each row sum up to 1. If the protection system 
is perfectly reliable, then the first column would have probabilities 1 and other columns 
zero. 
In addition, another matrix, Consequent Event Matrix (CEM), is developed in 
accordance with a CPIM. A CEM provides detailed information about consequent events 
in which some lines go out of service while some are not affected. In a CEM, each event 
is coded as a 12-digit binary number, of which the left 9 digits correspond to the 9 
transmission lines and the last 3 digits correspond to load branches 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively. A “1” digit indicates the corresponding component is going out of service 
whereas a “0” means this component is not affected. For example, an entry 
“100001100110” denotes a consequent event in which line 1, line 6, line 7, load branch 
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3, and load branch 4 are going out of service. A complete row of a CEM summarizes all 
possible consequent events when a primary fault occurs at this transmission line. 
To illustrate how the malfunctions of cyber elements affect transmission line 
tripping behaviors, the detailed analysis for the consequent events resulting from cyber 
element failures at substation (bus) 3 following a primary fault occurs at line 1 is shown 
below as an example. The analysis for the primary faults at other lines can be performed 
similarly. In the analysis, the failure modes of individual cyber elements are assumed 
independent since they are located in different units in a substation. Therefore, the 
probability of a consequent event can be obtained by multiplying the probabilities of 
individual element states in this event. 
Suppose a primary fault occurs at line 1, all possible consequent events can be 
categorized as follows. 
1) All protection elements operate as intended. 
If all protection elements operate as intended, then only line 1 will be isolated. 
The action of line 1 tripping associated with these elements at substation 3: MU 3-9, CB 
3-3, MU 3-3, CB 3-5, MU 3-5, Process Bus, and Line 1 Protection Panel. Multiply the 
UP probabilities of all these elements, the corresponding probability of this consequent 
event can be obtained, which is 0.996899850569. 
2) The Process Bus (PB) fails. 
If the PB fails, then the entire substation will be affected by this fault. All lines 
connected to this substation will be isolated by tripping the breakers at remote 
substations. The corresponding probability of this consequent event can be calculated 
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using Equation (4.9). This is an extreme case therefore the probability is very low. 
However, once this event happens, the impact is tremendous. 
3) One or both of MU 3-3, CB 3-3 fail(s), while all other associated elements 
operate as intended. 
In this case, CB 3-3 fails to trip while CB 3-5 trips as intended. The fault will be 
cleared by opening CB 3-2 and CB 3-5. As a result, Lines 1 and 4 will be isolated. 
4) One or both of MU 3-5, CB 3-5 fail(s), while all other associated elements 
operate as intended. 
In this case, CB 3-5 fails to trip while CB 3-3 trips as intended. The fault will be 
cleared by opening CB 3-3 and CB 3-4. As a result, Line 1 and load branch 3 will be 
isolated. 
5) The Process Bus (PB) doesn’t fail, but both CB 3-3 and CB 3-5 fail to trip 
due to various combinations of element states, such as Line 1 Protection 
Panel fails or the PB is in a DELAY state. 
In this case, the fault will be cleared by opening CB 3-2 and CB 3-4. As a result, 
Line 1, Line 4, and load branch 3 will be isolated. 
The results of all the 5 cases above are summarized in the first row of Table 29 
and Table 30. It should be noted that these consequent events are the results from cyber 
element failures. If the all associated cyber elements are perfectly reliable, then the first 
case would have probability one while all other cases zero. 
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Following similar procedures performed above, the complete Cyber-Physical 
Interface Matrices (CPIMs) and Consequent Event Matrices (CEMs) for buses 3, 4, and 
5 are obtained and are shown from Table 29 to Table 34. 
 
Table 29 The cyber-physical interface matrix for bus 3 
 
Fault 
Location 
Probabilities 
Line 1 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 4 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 5 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 6 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
 
 
Table 30 The consequent event matrix for bus 3 
 
Fault Location Events 
Line 1 100000000000 100111000000 100100000000 100000000100 100100000100 
Line 4 000100000000 100111000000 000110000000 100100000000 100110000000 
Line 5 000010000000 100111000000 000011000000 000110000000 000111000000 
Line 6 000001000000 100111000000 000001000100 000011000000 000011000100 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
Table 31 The cyber-physical interface matrix for bus 4 
 
Fault 
Location 
Probabilities 
Line 2 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 4 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 7 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 8 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
 
 
Table 32 The consequent event matrix for bus 4 
 
Fault Location Events 
Line 2 010000000000 010100110000 010000000010 010000010000 010000010010 
Line 4 000100000000 010100110000 000100010000 000100100000 000100110000 
Line 7 000000100000 010100110000 000100100000 000000100010 000100100010 
Line 8 000000010000 010100110000 010000010000 000100010000 010100010000 
 
 
Table 33 The cyber-physical interface matrix for bus 5 
 
Fault 
Location 
Probabilities 
Line 5 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 8 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
Line 9 0.996899850569 0.000009132337 0.000027312491 0.000027312491 0.003036392112 
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Table 34 The consequent event matrix for bus 5 
 
Fault Location Events 
Line 5 000010000000 000010011000 000010001000 000010000001 000010001001 
Line 8 000000010000 000010011000 000000010001 000000011000 000000011001 
Line 9 000000001000 000010011000 000000011000 000010001000 000010011000 
 
 
4.4.2 System-wide Reliability Evaluation 
 
The next event sequential Monte Carlo simulation [37] forms the main 
framework for the reliability evaluation at this stage. The detailed steps, including 
illustrations on how to utilize the results of a CPIM in the composite system reliability 
evaluation, have been illustrated in Section 2 and are summarized as follows. 
1) Initialize. 
2) Determine a primary event: Find the minimum time to the next event, update 
the corresponding element’s state, and update the total time. 
3) Determine consequent events: If the state change in step 2) indicates a 
primary fault occurring at a transmission line, then use CPIMs and CEMs to 
determine the consequent events and update elements’ states accordingly. If a 
CPIM row corresponding to this transmission line has n consequent events, 
the probabilities of these events (p1, p2, …, pn) sum up to 1. Draw a random 
number ranging from 0 to 1. The value of this random number determines 
which consequent event is going to happen. It should be noted that a 
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transmission line connects two substations. Therefore, two random numbers 
should be drawn independently to determine the consequent event at each 
substation. 
4) Effects of switching and repair: For the elements whose states have been 
changed in step 2) or in step 3), draw new random numbers to determine the 
time of their next transitions. Appropriate transition rates should be used 
according to situations. 
5) Evaluate system state: Perform the network power flow analysis to assess 
system operation states. Update reliability indices. 
6) Repeat steps 2) to 5) until convergence is achieved. 
In step 5), the following DC power flow based linear programming model [49]-
[51] is used with the objective of minimizing total load curtailment. 
Objective: 𝑦 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑁𝑏
𝑖=1  
subject to: 
?̂?𝜃 + 𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝐿                                                   (4.10) 
𝐺 ≤ 𝐺𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝐶 ≤ 𝐿 
𝐷𝐴𝜃 ≤ 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 
−𝐷𝐴𝜃 ≤ 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 
𝐺, 𝐶 ≥ 0 
𝜃1 = 0 
𝜃2…𝑁𝑏 unrestricted 
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where, 
Nb Number of buses 
C 𝑁𝑏 × 1 vector of bus load curtailments 
Ci Load curtailment at bus i 
?̂? 𝑁𝑏 × 𝑁𝑏 augmented node susceptance matrix 
G 𝑁𝑏 × 1 vector of bus actual generating power 
G
max
 𝑁𝑏 × 1 vector of bus maximum generating availability 
L 𝑁𝑏 × 1 vector of bus loads 
D 𝑁𝑡 × 𝑁𝑡 diagonal matrix of transmission line susceptances, with Nt the 
number of transmission lines 
A 𝑁𝑡 × 𝑁𝑏 line-bus incidence matrix 
θ 𝑁𝑏 × 1 vector of bus voltage angles 
F
max
 𝑁𝑡 × 1 vector of transmission line power flow capacities 
In equation (4.10), the variables are vectors θ, G, and C. Thus, the total number 
of variables is 3Nb. This problem can be solved by using the linprog function provided in 
MATLAB software. 
The convergence is measured by the coefficient of variation of a chosen index, as 
defined in [47]. A simulation with 200 simulated years is performed and the coefficient 
of variation for the system EENS drops below 5%. 
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4.4.3 Results and Discussions 
 
The simulation results of LOLP, LOLE, EENS, and EFLC for each bus and for 
the overall system are tabulated in Table 35. The simulated transmission line failure 
rates due to primary faults and protection system malfunctions are tabulated in Table 36. 
In Table 36, for line 3, the simulated line failure rate due to protection system 
malfunctions equals 0. This is because line 3 links bus 1 to bus 2 and protection 
malfunctions are not considered for either of the two buses. 
To make a comparison, the situation in which protection systems are assumed 
perfectly reliable is also simulated with results tabulated in Table 37. The comparison is 
also displayed in Figure 17. 
 
Table 35 Reliability indices for buses 
 
 LOLP LOLE (hours/year) EENS (MWh/year) EFLC (/year) 
Bus 1 0 0 0 0 
Bus 2 0.00015926 1.395 2.655 0.260 
Bus 3 0.00017063 1.495 8.597 0.300 
Bus 4 0.00019288 1.690 10.095 0.315 
Bus 5 0.00016786 1.470 3.729 0.275 
Bus 6 0.00124176 10.878 116.104 1.305 
Overall System 0.00128584 11.264 141.180 1.395 
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Table 36 Simulated transmission line failure rates 
 
Line 
No. 
Failure rate resulting from primary faults 
(/year) 
Failure rate resulting from protection malfunctions 
(/year) 
1 1.455 0.010 
2 4.850 0.005 
3 3.870 0 
4 1.030 0.075 
5 0.925 0.010 
6 1.570 0.010 
7 5.100 0.005 
8 1.080 0.010 
9 1.030 0.010 
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Table 37 EENS comparison 
 
 
EENS (MWh/year) 
Δ 
If protection systems are perfectly 
reliable 
Considering protection 
malfunctions 
Bus 1 0 0 N/A 
Bus 2 1.862 2.655 42.59% 
Bus 3 2.828 8.597 204.00% 
Bus 4 1.950 10.095 417.69% 
Bus 5 2.145 3.729 73.85% 
Bus 6 103.947 116.104 11.70% 
Overall 
System 
112.732 141.180 25.24% 
For each row, Δ is defined as the percentage increment of the EENS from not considering to considering 
protection malfunctions. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. EENS comparison at each bus. 
 84 
 
The results in Tables 36 and 37 show that protection system malfunctions have 
significant impact on energy unavailability even though they do not have much impact 
on individual line failure rates. Compared with not considering protection malfunctions, 
the percentage increment of the EENS for individual buses can be quite significant. 
The effects of protection system malfunctions on EENS are noticeable for buses 
3, 4, and 5, with increments of 204.00%, 417.69%, and 73.85%, respectively. These 
three buses are also the ones in which we have modeled and considered protection 
system malfunctions. This further points to the impact of protection malfunctions on 
energy unavailability. 
 
4.4.4 The Effects of Switching Time 
 
A value of 4.0 hours is assumed as the switching time for all transmission lines 
and this value has been used in the analysis in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 
In engineering practice, a switching process may be accelerated with the aid of 
smart grid technologies, or may be prolonged due to other factors. The quantitative 
relationship between switching time and system EENS are studied and the results are 
shown in Table 38. In each case, same value of switching time is assumed for all 
transmission lines and the system EENS is compared with the case in which the 
switching time is 4.0 hours. This relationship is also displayed in Figure 18. 
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Table 38 Effect of switching time on system EENS 
 
Switching Time 
(hours) 
System EENS 
(MWh/year) 
Percentage increment/decrement compared with the value of 
141.180 MWh/year in Table 37 
0.2 115.089 -18.48% 
0.5 120.941 -14.34% 
1 126.945 -10.08% 
2 132.675 -6.02% 
4 141.180 0 
10 157.615 +11.64% 
24 178.986 +26.78% 
48 190.628 +35.02% 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Relationship between switching time and system EENS. 
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The information in Table 38 and Figure 18 indicate a close relationship between 
the line switching time and the system EENS. The value of system EENS increases 
considerably with prolonged switching time. This also signifies the importance of using 
advanced technologies with which the process of fault location and cyber failure 
identification would be accelerated so that healthy lines can be switched back to service 
more promptly. 
 
4.5 The Scalability of the Overall Methodology 
 
As shown in Section 4, the overall methodology consists of two stages: 
1) Reliability analysis at the substation level (i.e., the work performed in Section 
4.4.1). 
2) System-wide reliability evaluation (i.e., the work performed in Section 4.4.2). 
In the first stage, the detailed analysis depends on the actual protection 
architecture of a substation. The analysis may seem to be tedious for a substation with 
complex architecture. However, the analysis in this stage can be performed locally at 
each substation and the computations can be performed offline. The increased workload 
for more complex substations does not change the framework of the overall 
methodology. It should be noted that although in this stage, the analysis is needed for 
each individual substation, with more experience in the analysis at substation level, it 
may be possible to generate classifications into types of substations and thus expedite the 
process. 
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Once the CPIMs and CEMs are established in the first stage, they can be 
permanently stored and can be directly plugged into the reliability evaluation in the 
second stage. The Monte-Carlo simulation performed in the second stage is generic and 
applicable for large power systems. 
The CPIM decouples the first stage of analysis from the second stage and makes 
the overall analysis more tractable. 
 
4.6 Considerations in Software Implementation for Large Power Systems 
 
The proposed methodology establishes a framework for power system reliability 
evaluation considering cyber-malfunctions in substations. Some implementation 
considerations are important to its application for large power systems. This section 
discusses two major considerations, the CPU time for Monte Carlo simulation and the 
storage of matrices. 
 
4.6.1 CPU Time for Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
The convergence in a Monte Carlo simulation is measured by the coefficient of 
variation of a chosen index. In this section, simulation is performed for 200 years and the 
coefficient of variation for the system EENS drops below 5%. The simulation is 
performed in MATLAB running on a computer with a 3.10 GHz processor and the 
running time for a simulation is approximately 8 minutes. It should be noted that this 
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software implementation of the simulation is only research grade to illustrate the concept 
and is therefore not the most efficient as far as the running time is concerned. The 
running time is largely consumed by the linprog function in MATLAB for DC power 
flow based linear programming to evaluate system operation states. In the development 
of a commercial grade program, the running time can be drastically reduced by several 
means as described below. 
1) The linear programming incorporating DC power flow can be performed less 
frequently with the use of heuristic algorithms for screening, thus reducing 
the CPU time. 
2) Simulation can be custom coded in more efficient programming languages. 
Custom programs are generally more efficient than generic ones coded in 
MATLAB. 
3) Much more efficient methods such as interior point methods can be used for 
linear programming. 
4) Monte Carlo simulation is readily amenable to parallel and distributed 
processing environments [52], [53] to reduce the CPU time. 
It is important to mention that Monte Carlo simulation has already been 
successfully used for large composite power systems but without considering the cyber-
malfunctions. The major contribution of this dissertation is to develop a methodology to 
include cyber induced dependent failures in such Monte Carlo programs. The cyber 
induced dependent failures can be included in Monte Carlo simulation by using CPIMs. 
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This does not significantly alter the number of times linear programming is called for 
and thus does not alter the CPU time much. 
 
4.6.2 Storage of Matrices 
 
For a given power system, let m be the total number of rows in all CPIMs (or 
CEMs), n be the number of columns in a CPIM (or a CEM). 
The value of m depends on the number of transmission lines. The number of 
transmission lines in an actual power system is typically 1.2 to 2 times of the number of 
buses. Each transmission line contributes a row in two CPIMs (or CEMs) corresponding 
to both of the two buses it connects to. Consider a power system with 1000 buses 
(substations), which is a typical size of an actual transmission grid, it is reasonable to 
estimate the number of transmission lines as 2000 and thus the value of m is estimated to 
be 4000. 
The value of n is determined by the row with maximum number of consequent 
events, which depends on the transmission line having maximum number of adjacent 
lines. Assuming a transmission line has maximum 10 adjacent lines, thus the maximum 
possible value of n is 2
10
, which is 1024. Of course, it is possible that a few transmission 
lines may have more than 10 adjacent lines. For such lines, only the 1024 most likely 
consequent events are considered since the remaining consequent events have negligible 
probabilities. Thus, it is reasonable to estimate n as 1024. 
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Each entry in a CPIM can be stored as a 64-bit double-precision floating-point 
number. Therefore, the total storage space needed for all CPIMs is 8∙m∙n Bytes, which 
equals 31.25 MB (32,768,000 Bytes). 
Each entry in a CEM is a binary number corresponding to a consequent event. 
For a system with 2000 transmission lines, 2000 bits are needed to represent such an 
event. Thus, each entry uses 250 Bytes (2000 bits) and the total storage space needed for 
all CEMs is 250∙m∙n Bytes, which equals 976.5625 MB (1,024,000,000 Bytes). 
Therefore, for a power system with 1000 buses, the total space needed to store all 
CPIMs and CEMs is estimated to be 1007.8125 MB, which is approximately 0.9842 GB. 
It is feasible to claim such space on hard drive or Random Access Memory (RAM). 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
In this section, a systematic reliability evaluation methodology is enhanced and 
implemented in a composite power system consisting of current-carrying components 
and protection systems with modern architecture. The quantitative relationship between 
switching time and system EENS is also studied. The results clearly indicate the impact 
of protection failures on system-wide reliability indices and also signify the importance 
of accelerating line switching process. 
The methodology implemented in this section is scalable and provides an option 
for the reliability evaluation of large cyber-physical power systems. For such systems, in 
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spite of more efforts needed in detailed analysis, the main procedures remain similar to 
those performed in this section. 
It should be noted that the methodology performed in this section is based on a 
sequential Monte Carlo simulation. It would be significantly beneficial for its application 
in large systems if the efficiency is further improved with the use of non-sequential 
techniques since non-sequential techniques generally require less computational and 
storage resources compared to sequential ones. Pertinent studies will be performed in the 
following section.   
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5. NON-SEQUENTIAL MONTE CARLO SIMULATION FOR CYBER-
INDUCED DEPENDENT FAILURES IN COMPOSITE POWER SYSTEM 
RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Cyber-induced dependent failures affect power system reliability and thus are 
important to be considered in composite system reliability evaluation. A scalable 
methodology is proposed in Section 2 [42] of this dissertation with the use of Cyber-
Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) that decouples the analysis of the cyber part from the 
physical part and provides the means of performing the overall analysis in a tractable 
fashion. In Section 4 [54], this methodology is further enhanced and implemented on an 
extended Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) with the illustration of its applicability for 
large power systems. 
The techniques used in Monte Carlo simulations can be basically classified into 
two categories known as sequential and non-sequential techniques [55]-[57]. The 
methodology presented in Section 2 and Section 4 is based on a sequential Monte Carlo 
technique and establishes the main framework for reliability evaluation of cyber-
physical power systems. Non-sequential methods are typically easier to implement and 
require much less computational and storage resources as compared to sequential 
methods [3], [23], [24]. Therefore, it would be significantly beneficial for the application 
of the proposed methodology in large systems if the efficiency is further improved with 
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the use of non-sequential techniques. However, the failure and repair processes in cyber-
induced events are inherently sequential involving dependent failures, making it very 
difficult to utilize a non-sequential sampling throughout the complete process in the 
same manner as in independent components by sampling the component states 
individually. 
It has been recognized that the basic idea in sampling is to sample states from a 
state space proportional to their probabilities [23]. For a large system it is not possible to 
first find the probabilities of all the states in the state space. Therefore, an approach is 
proposed in this section with the basic idea of developing a representative state space 
from which states can be sampled. This is achieved here by the use of sequential Monte 
Carlo simulation as the computational effort needed for only generating a chronological 
state sequence is negligible compared to the effort of evaluating the states using DC 
power flow based linear programming. A similar approach, called pseudo-sequential 
simulation, has been proposed in [24] but for completely different purposes. In [24], the 
approach is proposed with the purpose of computing duration-related reliability indices. 
In this section, the purpose is to include the characteristics of cyber-induced dependent 
failures. Also a method is used in this section such that the state space generated by 
sequential simulation does not need to be stored. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
sequential simulation may not be the only option for state space generation thus there 
may be alternative solutions. The major difficulties of applying conventional non-
sequential sampling methods to generating appropriate state space in the presence of 
dependent failures are also thoroughly explored in this section with the intention of 
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enlightening future studies on this subject as composite power system reliability 
evaluation in the presence of dependent failures has not received sufficient attention. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the 
overall problem. Section 5.3 illustrates the major difficulties of applying conventional 
non-sequential sampling methods to generating appropriate state space in presence of 
dependent failures. Section 5.4 introduces the proposed method with the use of 
sequential technique for state space generation. The implementation of the proposed 
method is demonstrated in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 is the summary of this section. 
 
5.2 Origination of Dependent Failures 
 
Traditional power system reliability evaluation focuses on the physical part only 
and assumes perfect reliability for the cyber part, which neglects cyber-induced failures 
and results in too optimistic evaluation. For realistic evaluation, it is necessary to 
consider cyber-induced failures as well as their impact on composite systems. 
Due to the complexity of cyber-physical interdependencies, it is hard and 
impractical to explicitly model and analyze the entire system, cyber and physical, in one 
step. A methodology has been proposed in Section 2 of this dissertation with the use of 
Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) to decouple the analysis of the cyber part from 
the physical part so that the overall evaluation is performed in a tractable fashion. 
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The format of a Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix is shown in Table 39. It can be 
obtained by examining the failure modes of cyber components and their impact on the 
physical system. 
 
Table 39 The format of a cyber-physical interface matrix 
 
 Event 1 Event 2 …… Event n 
Component 1 p11 p12 …… p1n 
Component 2 P21 P22 …… P2n 
…… …… …… …… …… 
Component m Pm1 pm2 …… Pmn 
 
 
The number of rows in a CPIM, denoted by m, corresponds to the number of 
transmission lines. The number of columns, denoted by n, corresponds to the number of 
consequent events. Consider a transmission line l (0 < l ≤ m) with k adjacent lines. When 
a fault occurs at line l, 0–k of its unfaulted adjacent lines can be isolated due to cyber 
malfunctions with 2
k
 maximum possible cases. The complete row l in a CPIM 
summarizes the probabilities of all possible consequent events (cases) given that a fault 
occurs at transmission line l. These probabilities are obtained by analyzing cyber 
element failure cases and their impact on transmission line tripping behaviors. It should 
be noted that these probabilities are a result of cyber failures. If the cyber part is 
perfectly reliable, there is only one consequent event with probability 1 in each row 
corresponding to the isolation of the faulty transmission line only. 
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In applications, another matrix called Consequent Event Matrix (CEM) is used as 
an auxiliary matrix for CPIM to identify specific components involved in a consequent 
event. The detailed illustrations of the CPIM and CEM have been presented in Section 4 
of this dissertation. 
Once the CPIM is obtained, its results can be directly utilized in the composite 
system reliability evaluation without the necessity of considering cyber element details. 
The steps of a sequential Monte Carlo simulation can be outlined as follows: 
1) Generate a chronological sequence of system state by drawing random 
numbers for each physical component and applying the load profile; 
2) Evaluate each system state and update reliability indices; 
3) If a state transition associates with a fault occurs on a transmission line, such 
as line i, then the i
th
 row of the CPIM is used to determine the consequent 
event. The probabilities of n possible events (pi1, pi2, …, pin) in the i
th
 row 
sum up to 1. Draw a random number r (0 < r < 1). The value of r determines 
which consequent event is going to happen. Update all affected component 
states in the determined consequent event; 
4) For the components whose states have been changed in step 2) or step 3), 
draw new random numbers to determine the time of their next transitions to 
update the chronological system state sequence; 
5) Repeat steps 2) to 4) until the convergence criterion is achieved. 
The steps shown above are completely based on sequential techniques. Non-
sequential techniques typically require much less CPU time and memory as compared to 
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sequential techniques and thus are preferable in applications for large systems. In order 
to seek possible non-sequential techniques that could be applied in the situation 
described above, it is important to first discuss the difficulties of applying conventional 
non-sequential sampling methods to generating appropriate state space in presence of 
cyber-induced dependent failures or other types of dependent failures, as presented in the 
following section. 
 
5.3 Problem of Applying Non-sequential Sampling for Dependent Failures 
 
It is important to first examine the basic idea of sampling a state in non-
sequential simulation in order to appreciate the problem of applying it to systems with 
dependent failures. Let us say that the state space S is defined by all states x ∈ S where 
the state x is represented by the states of components: 
x = (x1, x2, …, xn) 
where xi represents the state of component i. 
Now if the probabilities of all the states x of the system (i.e., the joint probability 
distribution of components) are known, then we can sample states by drawing a random 
number between 0 and 1 and formulating a process as follows. The interval between 0 
and 1 can be divided into segments equal to the number of system states, the length of a 
particular segment being equal to the probability of the state that the segment represents. 
Then one has to determine which segment the random number drawn falls in and that 
determines the state that is sampled. In practice it is more convenient to construct the 
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probability distribution function of x and determine the state. For example let us assume 
that the system has five states with their probabilities as shown in Figure 19 (a). These 
can be organized as a distribution function shown in Figure 19 (b). Now a random 
number between 0 and 1 can be drawn and put on the probability axis and the random 
variable axis to give the system state sampled. One should remember that the basic idea 
is that the states should be sampled proportional to their probabilities. 
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Figure 19. An example of sampling. 
 
 
The difficulties of applying conventional non-sequential sampling methods to 
generating appropriate state space in presence of dependent failures are discussed in this 
section. 
A small power system with three components is shown in Figure 20. Each 
component has two states, Up and Down. The scenarios in which the components are 
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completely independent, partially independent, and fully dependent are illustrated 
respectively as follows. 
 
G
1
2
3
 
Figure 20. A three-component system. 
 
 
5.3.1 Completely Independent Scenario 
 
In this scenario, the failure modes of all three components shown in Figure 20 are 
independent from each other. The corresponding state space transition diagram for the 
system is shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. The system state space diagram for completely independent scenario. 
 
 
The letters “U” and “D” represent Up and Down states, respectively. λi (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) 
represents the failure rate of component i. µi (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) represents the repair rate of 
component i. 
Because of the independence of individual component failure modes, the system 
state space can be decoupled into component states, as shown in Figure 22. When 
performing a non-sequential sampling, the states of individual components can be 
sampled independently and their combination yields a system state. For example, if the 
sampled states of individual components are 1U, 2D, and 3D, then the system state is 
(1U, 2D, 3D). It is actually this ability to sample a system state by a combination of 
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component states that makes the non-sequential method powerful as the probabilities of 
all the system states do not need to be known before sampling but only the probabilities 
of component states need to be known. The components can be two-state or multi-state 
but so long as they are independent, their states can be sampled at the component level. 
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Figure 22. The state transition diagrams for individual components. 
 
 
The Up and Down probabilities of individual components are readily 
computable. With the assumption of exponential reliability distribution, the Up and 
Down probabilities can be computed using equations (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. 
𝑝𝑈𝑝−𝑖 =
µ𝑖
𝜆𝑖+µ𝑖
                                                                                                     (5.1) 
𝑝𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛−𝑖 =
𝜆𝑖
𝜆𝑖+µ𝑖
                                                                                                 (5.2) 
 
5.3.2 Partially Independent Scenario 
 
In this scenario, components 1 and 2 have a common failure mode with failure 
rate λc12, as shown in Figure 23. 
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Component 3 is still independent from components 1 and 2. The corresponding 
state space transition diagram for the system is shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 23. The state transition diagrams for partially independent scenario. 
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Figure 24. The system state space diagram for partially independent scenario. 
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In this scenario, the system state space can still be decoupled if components 1 
and 2 are treated as a joint unit with four states. However, the probabilities of the four 
states need to be computed before performing a non-sequential sampling to generate the 
system state space. The four states, denoted by p1U2U, p1U2D, p1D2U, p1D2D, can be 
obtained by solving equation (5.3). This requires more effort in analytical analysis 
compared to the previous scenario. 
BP = C                        (5.3) 
where, 
P = [𝑝1𝑈2𝑈⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝1𝑈2𝐷⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝1𝐷2𝑈⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝1𝐷2𝐷]
𝑇 
B = [
−(𝜆2 + 𝜆1 + 𝜆𝑐12) µ2 µ1 0
1 1 1 1
𝜆1 0 −(µ1 + 𝜆2) µ2
𝜆𝑐12 𝜆1 𝜆2 −(µ1 + µ2)
] 
C = [0⁡⁡⁡⁡1⁡⁡⁡⁡0⁡⁡⁡⁡0]𝑇 
Once the four state probabilities are obtained, components 1 and 2 can be treated 
as a joint unit. The Up and Down probabilities of component 3 are readily computable 
from equations (5.1) and (5.2). A non-sequential sampling can be performed 
accordingly. 
 
5.3.3 Fully Dependent Scenario 
 
In this scenario, components 1 and 2 have a common failure mode with transition 
rate λc12 and components 2 and 3 have a common failure mode with transition rate λc23. 
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All three components also have a common failure mode with transition rate λc123. The 
corresponding state space transition diagram for the system is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. The system state space diagram for fully dependent scenario. 
 
 
In this scenario, it requires that the probabilities of all the system states be known 
before sampling can be performed. Due to the dependencies existing among all 
components, it is very difficult to decouple the system state space into mutually 
independent disjoint subsets with state probabilities readily available so that a non-
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sequential sampling can be conveniently performed. It is possible to analytically 
compute the system state probabilities for a small system with only a few components. 
However, for a large system consisting of highly dependent components, it is impractical 
to analytically compute the probabilities of all the system states before sampling is 
performed. This is what makes the application of non-sequential methods to systems 
with dependent failures challenging. 
 
5.4 Proposed Method 
 
The state space for an actually power system may consist of numerous states, as 
shown in Figure 26. Due to the effects of cyber-induced failures, various transitions exist 
among these system states. Examples of transitions can be a primary fault, a repair 
process, a cyber-induced expanded outage, or a switching process. 
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Figure 26. The system state space diagram for an actual power system. 
 
 
One approach of generating the system state space is to use a completely 
analytical method to compute the probabilities of all system states. However, the size of 
a large system as well as the complexity of various transitions may prohibit such an 
analytical analysis. 
Another approach is to decouple the entire system into mutually independent 
subsets so that system states can be sampled as combinations of subset states, as 
illustrated in the previous section. Each subset should consist of only a small number of 
components so that the state space for this subset can be readily developed with state 
probabilities computed. However, the high dependencies among system states in the 
presence of cyber-induced failures make such a decoupling very difficult. 
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It is, therefore, necessary to find some “smart” means of generating a 
representative system state space that preserves the causal and chronological features 
without insurmountable analytical computations. It is expected that this state space will 
not represent the entire state space but will be its representative. With this objective, a 
novel method is proposed in this section. 
The method is proposed based on the fact that in a sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation, the computational effort for only generating a chronological state sequence is 
small compared to the effort of evaluating the states using DC power flow based linear 
programming. Actually the method outlined below is valid irrespective of this 
observation but the computational advantage over pure sequential simulation is obtained 
only if the state evaluation process is computationally time consuming. 
1) Perform a sequential Monte Carlo simulation for N years to generate a 
chronological state sequence of system states. One hour is considered as the 
unit of time advancement so that a system state, which is a combination of all 
component states and load states, remains unchanged within each hour. 
Therefore, there are 8760N system states when the simulation is finished. 
These system states, each with probability 1/(8760N), establish a 
representative state space. They are generated sequentially therefore they 
preserve the chronological, causal, and dependent characteristics. For more 
precision, smaller time advancement like 0.25 hour can be selected. 
2) Randomly generate a list of 8760Ne (1 ≤ Ne < N) integer numbers with each 
random number having a value between 1 to 8760N. Pick up the 8760Ne 
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states from the state space generated in the previous step and evaluate them. 
It should be noted that since time unit of each state is the same, all of the 
states are equally probable. 
3) Calculate the reliability indices. 
To implement the procedure outlined above, a very large number of system states 
need to be stored first. This can make the storage and retrieval cumbersome and time 
consuming. To overcome this difficulty of storing the system states generated by the 
sequential Monte Carlo simulation, the list of 8760Ne random numbers can be generated 
first. The sequential Monte Carlo simulation is then performed and as it proceeds, it only 
evaluates the states existing in the list. Other states are discarded and therefore the states 
do not need to be stored. 
An intuitive expression of the proposed method is shown in Figure 27. A mark 
“X” indicates one of the 8760Ne hours generated in the list by random sampling. Then 
the sequential process is started and as the sampled hour (X) is encountered, the state is 
evaluated. Therefore, only the marked states are evaluated as the sequential simulation 
proceeds. All unmarked states are discarded. 
 
0 1 2 8760 N*8760... ... ...
... ... ... ...
3
...
X X X X... ... ......X
# of evaluated states: 
Ne*8760
t/hour
Total # of states: 
N*8760  
Figure 27. Expression of the proposed method. 
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5.5 Case Studies 
 
The proposed method is implemented in comparison with a completely 
sequential methodology, as described in Section 4 of this dissertation. The test system is 
established based on the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) [46] with extensions of 
cyber part at buses 3, 4, and 5. The placements and connections of cyber elements such 
as Current/Potential Transformers, Merging Units, and Protection Intelligent Electronic 
Devices, are defined in the extensions. The reliability data of the extended system are 
presented in Section 4. The hourly load profile is created based on the data in Tables 1, 
2, and 3 from [48]. 
Currently, the obstacle to performing the case studies in a larger system (such as 
an extended IEEE Reliability Test System [48]) is the unavailability of such a system 
with detailed configuration descriptions on the cyber part. The size of the RBTS permits 
us to perform such extensions, as described in Section 4, while the effort needed to 
extend the IEEE RTS is very significant and far beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The applicability of the completely sequential methodology for large power systems is 
illustrated in Section 4. Once a large test system with detailed descriptions on the cyber 
part is available, the method proposed in this section can be implemented as well. 
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5.5.1 Index Definitions 
 
In the completely sequential methodology, the reliability indices Loss of Load 
Probability (LOLP), Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), and Expected Energy Not 
Supplied (EENS) are defined in Section 4. The coefficient of variation (β) is defined as: 
𝛽 =
√𝑉(𝐹)/𝑁𝑦
𝐸(𝐹)
                                                                                                      (5.4) 
where V(F) is the variance of the test function, Ny is the number of simulated years, and 
E(F) is the expected estimate of the test function. 
For the method proposed in this section, reliability indices are defined as follows. 
𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑃 =
1
𝑁𝑘
∑ 𝐻𝑖
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1                                                                                             (5.5) 
where Nk is the total number of samples randomly selected from the state space. Nk 
equals 8760Ne with Ne defined in the previous section. Hi equals 1 if load curtailment 
occurs in the i
th
 sample, otherwise it equals 0. 
𝐿𝑂𝐿𝐸 = 𝐿𝑂𝐿𝑃 ∙ 8760                                                                                       (5.6) 
with unit of hours/year. 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 =
8760
𝑁𝑘
∑ 𝐶𝑖 ∙ (1⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟)
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=1                                                                       (5.7) 
with unit of MWh/year, where Nk is the total number of samples randomly selected from 
the state space. Ci is the load curtailment in the i
th
 sample, with unit MW. 
For the method proposed in this section, the coefficient of variation (β’) is 
defined as: 
𝛽′ =
√𝑉(𝐹)/𝑁𝑘
𝐸(𝐹)
                                                                                                    (5.8) 
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where Nk is the total number of samples randomly selected from the state space. V(F) is 
the variance of the test function. E(F) is the expected estimate of the test function. 
 
5.5.2 Results and Discussions 
 
The completely sequential methodology is simulated for 300 years. For the 
method proposed in this section, 8760N samples are generated as the representative state 
space, of which 8760Ne samples are randomly selected and evaluated. N = 300 and Ne = 
50 are used. 
The simulations are performed in MATLAB on a computer with a 3.20 GHz 
processor. The results are shown in Table 40. 
 
Table 40 Estimated reliability indices 
 
Index Completely Sequential Proposed Method with N = 300, Ne = 50 
LOLP 0.00131989 0.00134932 
LOLE 
(hours/year) 
11.562 11.820 
EENS 
(MWh/year) 
144.901 140.440 
CPU Time 
(seconds) 
501 212 
β/β’ of EENS 0.0340 0.0429 
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The comparison between the proposed method and the completely sequential 
methodology clearly indicates an efficiency improvement in evaluation. With an 
acceptable coefficient of variation (<5%), the CPU time of the proposed method is 
reduced to less than 50% of the time consumed by the completely sequential 
methodology. It should be noted that the relative CPU times are important but the 
absolute values of CPU times can be significantly improved in both cases by using more 
efficient linear programming modules. 
The relationship between the selected sample size (Ne) and the estimated system 
EENS is plotted in Figure 28. Also, the relationship between Ne and the coefficient of 
variation (β’) of EENS is plotted in Figure 29. Both of the two cases are studied with N = 
300 to generate the representative state space. 
 
 
Figure 28. Relationship between EENS and selected sample size (Ne). 
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Figure 29. Relationship between coefficient of variation (β’) and selected sample size(Ne). 
 
 
5.6 Summary 
In this section, a non-sequential approach is proposed for systems involving 
dependent failures. A representative state space is generated from which sampling can be 
performed. The sequential technique is used to generate this representative state space 
that preserves the chronological and causal characteristics of cyber-induced incidents. 
The non-sequential technique is used with the major objective of accelerating evaluation 
process. The results clearly show an efficiency improvement by the proposed method 
compared to the completely sequential methodology, with an acceptable precision. The 
efficiency improvement will be even more significant for applications in large cyber-
physical power systems. 
It should be noted that the sequential simulation may not be the only option to 
generate the representative state space, which is basically a joint probability distribution 
of component probability distributions. The major difficulties of applying conventional 
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non-sequential sampling methods to generating appropriate state space in presence of 
dependent failures are thoroughly discussed in this section with the intention of 
enlightening future studies on this subject. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
This dissertation extends the scope of bulk power system reliability modeling and 
analysis with the consideration of cyber elements. The major contributions, research 
conclusions, and outlook are summarized as follows. 
   
6.1 Contributions and Research Conclusions 
 
In Section 2, a novel methodology for composite cyber-physical power system 
reliability analysis is proposed. The concept of Cyber-Physical Interface Matrix (CPIM) 
is introduced. A typical substation protection system with modern features is designed 
and analyzed as an example to illustrate the construction and utility of CPIM. The CPIM 
is the critical idea in the proposed methodology. It decouples the analysis of the cyber 
part from the physical part and provides the means of performing the overall analysis in 
a tractable fashion. 
In Section 3, the consideration of cyber-link failures is included in substation 
modeling. The results clearly indicate a degradation of system reliability due to cyber-
link failures. 
In Section 4, the CPIM is realized into a concrete application from an abstract 
concept. The overall methodology for composite system reliability evaluation with the 
use of CPIM is enhanced and implemented on an extended Roy Billinton Test System 
(RBTS). The results clearly indicate the impact of cyber-induced failures on system-
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wide reliability indices and also signify the importance of accelerating switching 
process. With its scalability illustrated, the overall methodology provides a scalable 
option for reliability evaluation of large cyber-physical power systems. 
In Section 5, the difficulties of using non-sequential techniques when there are 
dependent failures are thoroughly explored. An approach is proposed to overcome the 
difficulties by generating a representative state space from which states can be sampled. 
Furthermore, a method is introduced such that the state space generated by the sequential 
process does not need to be stored. The results clearly show an efficiency improvement 
of the proposed approach compared to the completely sequential methodology, with an 
acceptable precision. The efficiency improvement will be even more beneficial for 
applications in large cyber-physical power systems.       
 
6.2 Outlook 
 
The overall methodology proposed in this dissertation establishes the main 
framework for reliability evaluation of large cyber-physical power systems. More 
technical details, such as the internal structure of the Process Bus, can be considered in 
cyber part modeling without changing the framework of the proposed methodology. 
Consideration of these details will provide more precise probabilities in the CPIM and 
thereby yield more realistic reliability indices. 
Furthermore, it has been recognized in this dissertation that the unavailability of 
a large reliability test system with detailed description on the cyber part is an obstacle for 
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testing developed methodologies. It is worthwhile to develop such a system as this is of 
crucial significance for future cyber-physical reliability studies. The development of 
such a test system requires substantial efforts as well as sound judgment from industry. 
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